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The most contentious, unresolved issue in biomedicine in the last twenty-
five years has been how to best address compensated partnerships between
academic researchers and the pharmaceutical industry. Law and policy
deliberately promote these partnerships through intellectual property law,
research funding programs, and drug and device approval pathways while
simultaneously condemning them through conflict-of-interest (COI) regulations.
These regulations have not been subjected to the close scrutiny that is typically
utilized in administrative law to evaluate and improve regulatory systems. This
Article suggests that the solution to this standoff in biomedical law and policy
lies in an informed, empirical approach. Such an approach must both recognize
such partnerships' legal and practical variations, as well as classify them based
on their benefit to innovation and their harm to research biases. Ultimately, this
approach must facilitate administrative reforms that would convert what is now
an inherently arbitrary, yet widespread, regulatory regime into an epistemically
rich mechanism for distinguishing between harmful and beneficial partnerships.
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Applications, and Staff Scientist, Boston Children's Hospital Informatics Program; Former Deputy
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INTRODUCTION
For several decades there has been a close and productive working
alliance between universities, research institutes, Government agencies, and
private industry in the area of biomedical research. These relationships were
enhanced significantly during the 1980's through new laws and regulations that
improved the collaborative environment for research and innovation among
Government and industry laboratories and the nation's research institutions. This
partnership was strengthened by powerful incentives designed to encourage
development and commercialization of innovative technologies initially
discovered during Government-sponsored research. .. . These goals have largely
been achieved. America leads the world in biomedical research and innovation
through the transfer of technology spawned by these policies.'
[T]here is no conceivable social benefit in researchers' having equity
interest in companies whose products they are studying. 2
The IOM committee is not familiar with any evaluations of the
implementation or the consequences of different [conflict of interest]
management strategies. This is a significant deficit. 3
Medical innovation depends on academic discovery partnered with private
sector corporate action, to translate novel science into practical applications. No
longer may academic medical researchers simply labor in isolation for
knowledge's own sake, producing glowing abstractions from the Ivory Tower's
cocooned interior. Now, American society asks that researchers invent and that
their inventions be available as cures. "Where are the cures?" is not just a
headline,4 but an expression of a common expectation. The law reflects this
I To Examine the Implementation of the Government Patent Policy Act, Which Allows
Universities to Patent the Results of Research Funded By the Federal Government and License
Their Inventions in the Marketplace: Hearing on P.L. 96-517 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2 (1994) (statement of
the American Council on Education, the Association of American Universities, and the National
Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges).
2 Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1517 (2000).
3 Inst. of Med. of the Nat'I Acad. of Sci., Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education
and Practice 84 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn Field eds., 2009) , available at http://www.iom.edu/
Reports/2009/Conflict-of-Interest-in-Medical-Research-Education-and-Practice.aspx [hereinafter
IOM report].
4 See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Where Are the Cures?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/10/31/where-are-the-cures.html; Mary Carmichael & Sharon
Begley, Desperately Seeking Cures-How the Road from Promising Scientific Breakthrough to
Real-World Remedy Has Become All but a Dead-End, NEWSWEEK (May 15, 2010), available at
137
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expectation by creating rewards for academic-industry collaboration and
requiring compensation to be distributed accordingly. And this policy works; as
incentivized collaboration streams inventions from academia to industry, this
country's biotechnological development booms.
Yet in the midst of this biotechnological wealth, critics abound. Professional
leadership within organized medicine condemns industry affiliations across the
board, implying that professional virtue can never be reconciled with innovation
economics. Headlines involving research gone awry imply that nefarious
financial incentives cause research trials to be unsafe. Medical journals dutifully
aggregate author disclosures of industry payments, giving no attention to their
potential variety and treating the cumulative number of these payments as
irrefutable evidence of corrupted judgment. Such approaches treat all academic-
industry partnerships as corrupt, without identifying those forms that genuinely
contribute to innovation with reasonable terms calculated to avoid unmanageable
research bias.
In short, society promotes collaboration, yet also despises it. The federal
government requires institutions to regulate conflicts of interest through general
standards of unresolved ambiguity, through an isolated mandate that is
disconnected from procedures to address research integrity, protection of human
and animal research participants, and professional obligations to patients. Yet
these regulations give no weight to the need for innovation or what drives it. At
the same time, in the distinct arena of technology transfer and tax credit, the law
incentivizes biomedical researchers to engage with industry, but neither provides
clear ethical constraints nor requires practical accountability to identify and
address the potential harms to patients or science that could be produced by these
conflicts of interest (COIs). The law promotes researchers' active involvement in
sharing knowledge with companies, but, in the name of transparency, or
"sunshine,"5 the law requires disclosure of nominal payments, without
explanation of the purpose or context, as if this fact alone would conclusively
establish an improper relationship. It is apparent that the values of the academic
scientific community-such as sharing data and discoveries-are at war with
proprietary standards. Yet private and academic institutions continue to fuel these
conflicts.'
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/15/desperately-seeking-cures.html (observing that "judging by
the only criterion that matters to patients and taxpayers-not how many interesting discoveries
about cells or genes or synapses have been made, but how many treatments for diseases the money
has bought-the return on investment to the American taxpayer has been approximately as
satisfying as the AIG bailout").
5 Physician Payment Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. VI, § 6002, 124 Stat. 689 (2010).
6 See generally Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (construing narrowly
the common law research exception for academic and other research within the scope of patent
rights and discussing the growing industrial role of universities given the title transfer and other
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000)). For an account of academic
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This fierce, internal battle in innovation and research policy calls for careful
reconciliation of the competing goals at issue along with precise management.
Instead, COIs arising from industry-academic relationships are subject to
decentralized institutional management under federal standards so incomplete
and vague that they are impossible to apply consistently. The federal standards
require risk assessments, which adjudicators on COI committees can make only
by relying on often idiosyncratic, personal assumptions about human behavior
and incentives, which vary among institutions and committee members, and have
not been evaluated for their generalizability. The resulting range of COI
''management plans" has never been systematically evaluated for either its
efficacy or its necessity. No mechanism exists to reconcile precisely the values
and laws constituting the "innovation ecology,"'7 whether in COI policymaking,
in adjudicating and managing COIs, in licensing academic intellectual property
to industry, or in creating academic-industry relationships. Currently, the
regulatory system pays no heed to the benefit provided by innovation, fails to
assess which compensated academic-industry relationships genuinely contribute
to innovation, and lacks any factual basis to assess actual risk of bias. In this way,
current regulations are unresponsive to the realities of both academia and the
biotech industry. Current regulations also fail to establish basic requirements that
would allow adjudications and policies to be consistently and soundly executed.
Thousands of independent adjudicators, with no required qualifications, operate
under an ambiguous standard. Their job is to identify collaborations that create
bias risk; yet they have no empirical basis for doing so. Administrative law
usually nests such tasks within a context of records, rights, and appeals, but this
is not the case with these COI regulations. There is no mechanism for
adjudicators to test their judgments with concrete evidence, correct themselves,
applicability to clinical research in which intellectual property is already industry-owned, see
Angell, supra note 2.
7 William A. Wulf, Changes in Innovation Ecology, 316 SCIENCE 1253 (2007). Law affects
the innovation ecology through diverse and indirect means. Financially, it provides patent
protection, at least for the inventive phase of discovery, as well as federal and state tax incentives to
promote research. Recognizing that innovation involves both risk and investment, the legal regime
shelters it within for-profit corporate forms that immunize shareholders and grants federal tax-
exempt status to academic hospitals and universities, as well as research institutions by name.
Fiduciary law holds directors to standards of reasonable care and loyalty, not perfection. Whether
promoting innovation is its purpose, the resulting flexibility allows risk-taking in new areas and
respects the search for plausible alternates to the status quo. U.S. federal regulations must now
address the regulatory burdens they impose, although without special attention to innovation.
Nonetheless, they do contemplate the burdens on small businesses, which are a rough proxy for one
innovation trajectory, in which the progress of innovation is reflected in the transformation of small
start-ups into large enterprises. Health care antitrust exempts clinically integrated arrangements,
recognizing that their novelty coincides with an imperative to reduce health care organizational
fragmentation. Legal conferences and symposia reflect a similar preoccupation with innovation.
Innovation policy is intellectual property policy, deregulatory policy, tax policy, economic
development policy, and corporate policy. But it is not yet COI policy.
139
5
Taylor: Innovation Incentives or Corrupt Conflicts of Interest? Moving Be
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
or contribute epistemically to the body of case law. So operationally incomplete
are these regulations that it will be useful to compare them and the conduct they
set in motion to jurisprudential accounts of which enactments really qualify as
"law"-including such basic concepts as whether regulations provide sufficient
notice or can even be obeyed. Those accounts set standards, which current
regulations fail, for what a legal regulatory system concerning COls would
minimally entail.8
Descriptively, this Article claims that current health policy fails to reconcile
tensions that arise from its encouraging innovation through academic-industry
collaborations, while simultaneously sanctioning these partnerships for their
potential impact on research integrity. Policy mandates to work together do not
distinguish those innovative collaborations, which could generate research bias,
from beneficial ones. Furthermore, the administrative structure for COIs in this
field demands guesswork about research harm and fails to distinguish between
academic-industry partnerships on the basis of their innovation potential or the
diverse nature of their contractual terms. These flaws render the regulatory
structure inadequate, under general administrative law standards, and ineffective,
in executing the specific task of distinguishing socially beneficial collaborations
from destructive arrangements. Normatively, this Article claims that society may
arrive at a better reconciliation of the competing imperatives of research integrity
and biomedical innovations by precisely distinguishing among such
collaborations-on the basis of their purpose, terms, and structure-and
strengthening the form and factual basis for administrative regulation.
This reconciliation can occur by framing the choices facing these COIs in
clear terms, rather than obscuring these challenges with an abstract demand for
scientific independence that no longer comprehensively characterizes social
expectations for research. With better data about which collaborations foster bias
and which actually contribute unique scientific talent to the innovation process,
regulation could be precise, predictable, factually founded, and reflect a
conscious societal choice among potentially competing values. The key goals of
this Article are thus: (1) to understand the basis for sound regulation and safe
harbors, rather than grounding a system in ad hoc prohibitions relying on factual
uncertainty; and (2) to establish default rules that lead us towards a greater
understanding of what an optimal legal system would require to conservatively
avoid human harms. The point is not to abandon virtue by permitting conflicts of
interest. Rather, the goal is to reconcile our account of ethical research with
social expectations by taking into consideration the likely effects of contractually
8 See, e.g., Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice-A Reply to Legal Positivism (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2010); John Austin, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE, or THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (Robert Campbell ed., 2002); Lon Fuller,
The Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994); Cass
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
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distinct collaborations discerned from aggregate data.9 This factual account,
however, requires adopting an evaluative stance less governed by the currently
venerable, but incomplete, account of scientific virtue.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I focuses on COIs, their source in
legal mandates for collaboration, their consequences, and their variety. While
collaboration is inevitable, COIs are not. The standard inference from COI
cases-that all collaboration must be avoided to prevent COIs-is therefore
mistaken. Even when an improper collaboration incentive is identified, it is of
little help in deciding whether other forms of collaboration should be suspect.
Many variables pertaining to the context, purpose, and structure of collaboration
arrangements can materially affect intuitive judgments about COI risk.
Part II focuses on regulations. It starts with a basic query: Are United States
regulations well-equipped to address the nuanced differences among diverse
collaboration arrangements? Since collaboration mandates and programs do not
address COI risk, the focus of this query is the two main regulatory approaches to
COIs advanced by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Public
Health Service (PHS), a component of which is the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), as well as the self-regulatory structure offered by the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC). To a student of administrative law, these
regulatory structures will be like visiting the land that time forgot: so
conspicuous is the absence of even rudimentary forms of administrative
accountability and control. To highlight the point, Part II assesses the
effectiveness of these systems through the perspectives of the jurisprudential
categories proposed by Cass Sunsteinio and others. Ultimately, Part II shows that
the regulatory proposals fail to attain their own goals, apart from the socially
necessary goal of situating COIs in an innovation ecology that optimizes
competing values.
Part III categorizes and discusses perspectives on COIs from the business
and legal literature. Despite the merits of this literature, none of it recommends
an empirical basis for COI management. Like the current regulations, the
literature does not distinguish among collaborations on the basis of whether they
make actual contributions to innovation or whether the arrangements find ways
to minimize research bias while maximizing innovation value. The primary value
of the existing literature is that it illustrates the limits of a nonempirical approach,
with its energy spent on warring accounts of scientific virtue that yield no
practical recommendation to reconcile collaborations' innovation and COI
9 In, KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS (2008), Appiah argues that,
henceforth, no account of human virtue should be ungrounded in the lessons of behavioral
economics and other empirically demonstrable patterns of human thinking. Only then can virtue
ethics-as an account of the ideal human life leading to happiness-fulfill its practical promise to
make people both virtuous and happy.
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values.
Throughout the Article, I will build on the intuition that the very existence of
a COI turns more on the terms, purpose, and context of academic-industry
arrangements than on the simple fact of the industry-to-scientist payments to
which most regulations attend.
I. ARE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST NECESSARY?
Financial conflicts of interest are not inherent to the research enterprise.
They are entirely optional, unlike intellectual or personal conflicts of interest to
which they are often compared."
Conflicts of interest are ubiquitous and inevitable in academic life, indeed, in
all professional life. The challenge for academic medicine is not to eradicate
them, which is fanciful and would be inimical to public policy goals, but to
recognize and manage them sensibly and effectively.' 2
A. Collaboration is Necessary and Unavoidable
Both industry and government are indispensable players in biomedical
research and development. Collaboration is a necessity, for reasons that are
economic, historic, and legal, and it is important to understand why this is the
case.
Biomedical research is divided into stages, from basic inquiry to research
directly involving human beings or their identifiable data. Approximately $30.9
billion was budgeted by the U.S. government for NIH funding for the fiscal year
2012.13 Most of these dollars are allocated to basic scientific research (e.g., the
stuff of petri dishes, signal transduction pathways, model organisms, novel
chemical reactions, etc.); the remainder is for clinical (biobanking, biomarker
diagnostics, novel surgical procedure development, etc.) and public health
research (e.g., infectious disease preparedness, epidemiology of obesity,
pervasiveness of self-destructive behaviors in the United States, etc.). 14 However,
II Marcia Angell, Remarks at HHS Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial
Conflicts of Interest (Aug. 16, 2000), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/coi/8-16.htm#
Angell.
12 David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 284 JAMA 2234, 2234 (2000).
13 See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2012, available at http://
officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/cy.html.
14 NIB funds are awarded through a highly competitive application process spelled out in a
continuously updated, publicly available constellation of policies called collectively "grants policy
and guidance," together with refinements specific to a given program or funding opportunity
publicized by the NIH. Applications can be found on the NIH website. NIH OFFICE OF
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it takes much more to turn basic science into diagnostics and therapies.
Translating discoveries into products that are safe and effective for human use,
and making those products available, necessarily involves private industry.
Reflecting the growing demand for drugs, industry sponsorship of
biomedical research (including payments to academic researchers) has increased
exponentially in the past two decades. One widely cited authority estimates that,
between 1980 and 2003, such expenditures by U.S. pharmaceutical companies
increased from $2 billion to $33 billion.15 Even if such figures are overstated,16
there is no question that industry funding for research, development, and
influence over physicians and scientists, collectively, matches or exceeds
government funding for biomedical research. Its rate of increase far surpasses the
rate for government spending (calculable from the sources cited) in which
inflation offsets, in real terms, the modest numerical increases over time. This
industry spending helps sustain a pharmaceutical market that exceeds $200
billion per year in revenue in the United States alone.17
formal, technically accurate, and binding set of official policies governing applications post-award
management, see, NIH Grants Policy Statement, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH (Oct. 1, 2012), available
at http://www.grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2012/index.htm. The application requires a
detailed discussion of the importance of the general research background and focus, hypotheses,
research aims, methods to be employed, qualifications and competencies, and resources available.
Importantly, the grant application need not identify for reviewers conflicts of interest or contractual
commitments to third parties, which could affect the selection of the research problem, the design
of the research, its conduct, data analysis, and reporting. If awarded, the money will come with
certain conditions. As far as the scientist is concerned, there will be data-sharing mandates of
varying force and specificity. There must also be a promise that, if there is an invention from the
research, the institution will promptly disclose it to the NIH, elect whether to hold the title and seek
to develop the invention through, for example, patenting it and then licensing it to companies. In
return, at least 15% of the net revenue goes to researchers. Notably, for NIH-funded research, a
scientist maintains modest discretion to stray from the project proposal during the discovery
process. It is understood, and, indeed expected, that initial discoveries will lead to novel hypotheses
and therefore novel experiments, using methods that cannot be specified in the application in
advance. This also means, of course, that the researcher has discretion to reallocate, within
reasonable limits, proposed expenditures that were used to justify an initial budget request. Thus, a
scientist has professional discretion to deviate from the description of a proposed project that
merited an award, in a system that itself promotes COls through the revenue-to-inventor process.
Furthermore, peer reviewers are not aware of any past, present, or future COls arising from a
scientist's economic stake in licensed patents from previous or concurrent federally funded
research. There is no COI review at the application review stage.
15 See Gordon DuVal, Institutional Conflicts Of Interest: Protecting Human Subjects,
Scientific Integrity, and Institutional Accountability, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 613 (2004).
16 MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 3-20, 37-51 (2004) (discussing
"How Much []the Pharmaceutical Industry Really Spend[s] on R&D").
17 Id. A company will wish to contractually commit a researcher to a definite course of
research. The company then will claim for its own use the resulting intellectual property without
necessarily sharing or developing it, and it will keep all data confidential, keep a researcher to a
budget that is both justified and well defined, and focus on research aims that have a direct bearing
on its business venture. If the sponsored research is clinical, then it is almost certain that the
company is pursuing it in support of an application to the FDA to permit marketing of a diagnostic
143
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Human testing is most often funded by industry, in connection with private
companies exercising their rights and obligations under FDA regulations as
"sponsors" of an application for approval to market a novel diagnostic or
therapy. 8 FDA approval depends on data supporting safety and effectiveness
through favorable outcomes in clinical research studies that are often large-scale,
expensive, and uncertain. Sponsors' functions, such as establishing
manufacturing facilities, independent trial monitoring, and sales networks, are far
removed from typical academic functions. Thus, while the law does not prohibit
academic investigators from being sponsors, and while novel therapies may start
this way, in practice industry involvement is essential and almost universal. Yet
the reliability and disinterestedness of clinical research is important in evaluating
results from clinical trials. For this reason, those who conduct clinical research,
termed "investigators," are often academic researchers paid by industry for their
research.
This simple fact is at the core of the COI problem. Academic researchers are
key players in research and development. Universities and academic hospitals are
the main progenitors of biomedical discovery, and they are necessary at every
stage of knowledge and product development, up to and including studies to test
products' safety and efficacy on human beings. Eliminating all industry
payments to academic researchers is neither practical nor desirable. The result
would be industry assessing the safety and efficacy of its own products-hardly
an increase in disinterestedness!
Other government policies also reflect public expectations that academic
scientists involve themselves directly with industry and industry projects. First,
under the "NIH Roadmap" or "translational research initiative,"' 9 an increasing
amount of government funds will be spent on connecting the dots among basic
research, the translational research that will lead to human applications, the
clinical research on human participants to test safety and efficacy, and the
resulting health care products. These products will, in turn, enable health care
or therapeutic use. This will trigger the applicability of FDA regulations defining the role of a
"sponsor," or funder, and a "principal investigator" or basic inventor. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.50-
.70(2012) (drugs); 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.40-.47 (2012) (devices).
1 8 With limited exceptions, these regulations prohibit the interstate marketing of drugs,
devices, and biologicals for the diagnosis or treatment of a disease, unless the FDA has approved an
application to market that establishes safety and efficacy. Regulations establish a process for
seeking such approval, and it is this process that requires scientific data that must emerge,
inevitably, from credible research. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2005) (drug approval process);
21 C.F.R. §812 (2005) (device approval process).
19 See, e.g., Declan Butler, Translational Research: Crossing the Valley of Death, 453
NATURE 840 (2008); Steven H. Woolf, The Meaning of Translational Research and Why It
Matters, 299 JAMA 211 (2008). For an example of a specific application to a particular research
area, in this case, drug abuse causes, diagnosis, and treatment, see Cross-Disciplinary Translational
Research at NIH, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-07-
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reforms in a process interwoven with industry partnership.
Second, the need to accelerate the development and distribution of therapies
for AIDS led to special regulatory provisions for rapid approval and treatment
access outside traditional clinical research protocols. 20 However, decreased
evidentiary review before human use means fewer opportunities to detect errors.
Pressure to approve potential cures means, at the least, less incentive to question
trial design or conduct, and perhaps even affirmative pressure to take a
permissive approach (especially given the agency's funding through user fees).2 1
Third, a bundle of interrelated initiatives explicitly allows the FDA to
approve drugs by relaxing standards that it might otherwise apply. For example,
the FDA might permit a company to condense its clinical trial sequence into two
phases (rather than the three or four phases normally required by regulation) or
accept as sufficient data showing efficacy within shorter endpoints than it might
otherwise demand.22 This policy is, and ought to be, controversial, for the
practical impact might be the approval of a drug whose short-term or long-term
effectiveness and safety is uncertain or whose effectiveness in one clinically
defined sense might be rebutted by a narrower or broader description of the
objectives of the trial. If a COI affects trial design decisions and approvals
proposals, the potential consequences are significant.23
Fourth, another incentive structure, designed to reward previous research
and inventions, may also create COIs for future research. The 1980 Bayh-Dole
Act, a cornerstone of innovation policy, revolutionized academic-to-industry
knowledge transfers.24 Academic institutions may retain title to inventions
20 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.50-70 (2012); Sheila R. Shulman & Andrea Kuettel, Drug Development
and the Public Health Mission: Collaborative Challenges at the FDA, NIH, and Academic Medical
Centers, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 663 (2005).
21 See generally Shulman & Kuettel, supra note 20.
22 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.80-88, 314.500-560 (1999).
23 Post-approval review does not resolve these COI-related concerns for three reasons. First,
the FDA's post-marketing surveillance and review is historically deficient and is still weak, as
reported in the General Accountability Office's most recent survey. See U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-68, DRUG SAFETY: FDA HAS BEGUN EFFORTS To ENHANCE
POST-MARKET SURVEILLANCE BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl068.pdf. Second, in post-approval review, as in pre-market
approval, the FDA is still dependent, in whole or in part, on researchers. If these researchers are
non-industry academics, they are the very individuals whose COls we are examining. Third, these
two regulatory pathways are intended to address the needs of people who are gravely ill, or the
safety characteristics of drugs whose accelerated approval ought to be uncontestable. Neither
category would be well served by postponing evaluation of any effect of COls until after patients
and consumers have started consuming the drug to their detriment.
24 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2012) (regulations
associated with the Bayh-Dole Act). The Act (also called the Patent and Trademark Law
Amendments Act) grants recipients of federally funded research grants and contracts, such as
universities and research hospitals, the right to take title to intellectual property rights in any
inventions that arise in the course of the federally funded research, provided that they are able to
accomplish the following: (a) act diligently to protect the discovery, such as through patent filings
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arising in the course of federally funded research, if, among other things, they
actively seek to license the invention to the private sector for development, and if
resulting net revenue is split between the academic inventors and the institution's
educational and research purposes. Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act mandates that an
inventive scientist share in a discovery's resultant revenue, if research and
development confirm its potential value as a product. This would cause no COI if
the inventing scientist then switched fields. But if, as is likely, the scientist
continues to perform research in the same field, the potential profit stream from
the discovery will readily create two forms of COls. The first is in selecting
research topics: a financial interest in confirming, perfecting and supplementing
the licensed invention conflicts with exploring discoveries that would compete
with it or break novel ground. The second reflects the scientist's financial interest
in producing results consistent with the prior discovery's marketing.
Notably, none of these policy initiatives addresses the obvious potential they
create for COIs. There are no requirements that collaborations be structured to
avoid COIs, let alone parameters or safe harbors that might aid that purpose. In
both regulation and academic discussion, two worlds emerge, instead of one. To
create an integrated world, it is imperative to understand the source of potential
conflict between legal imperatives for academic scientists to collaborate and
other norms for academic scientists.
B. Collaborations Gone Bad: Individual Cases and Statistical Associations
Three influences have grounded COI policy to date, and it is important to
distinguish among them. The first influence is a set of professional values,
originating in an era before innovation policy started to demand or incentivize
academic-industry collaboration. It is primarily leaders of organized biomedical
science that articulate these professional norms, including independent judgment,
fiduciary duties to patients, and exclusivity for physicians in making health care
judgments; these are often portrayed as values under siege. 2 5 These are the same
values that led, in an earlier time, to legal doctrines rejecting the corporate
practice of medicine, and, in modem times, to the medical profession's steadfast
opposition to managed care, corporate forms of quality assurance, and integrated
after having notified the agency funder of that intention; (b) actively seek to license its use by the
private sector in a reasonable way that will promote public benefit; (c) return some of the net
proceeds to the inventor(s); and (d) devote the balance of net proceeds to education or research.
Previously, the agency funders took title, and few transfers of discoveries to industry for
development occurred. Bayh-Dole was designed to incentivize academic inventors to invent,
institutions to license to industry, and for both academia and industry to form enduring
collaborative relationships through which academic discoveries could flow through industry to the
public.
25 See Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations
(1973); Patrick Taylor, Research Sharing, Ethics and Public Benefit, 25 Nature Biotech. 398
(2007).
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delivery systems. 26 This value scheme teaches complete separation from
industry, regards industry as quintessentially unable to make medically informed
and disinterested research judgments, and prohibits all industry contact as
inescapably threatening to the independence and integrity of physicians and
scientists.27
The separation must be even stricter for academic scientists and physicians
because of their role as creators and guardians of knowledge. Physicians and
scientists who work for corporations legitimately focus on advancing corporate
goals, and physicians in private practice may practice for a profit. But academic
scientists have superseding ethical obligations to research participants, present
and future members of the academic community, research funders, and the public
at large. Their work must reflect values essential to the credible advancement of
knowledge - integrity, competence, objectivity, transparency, and reliability in
the discovery process, as well as respect for human and animal research
participants-that trump competing concerns, including economic ones. These
values are reflected in sources as diverse as the Internal Revenue Code, 28 policy
manuals and regulations of the NIH, 29 associational guidelines, and institutional
26 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 198-232, 420-49
(1982) (discussing resistance to corporate control and employment and discussing the medical
profession's opposition to managed care and corporate standards).
27 The medical literature by professional leaders is rich with debate in these terms. For
leading examples of what I will call the "Virtue-Prohibitionist approach," see JOHN ABRAMSON,
OVERDO$ED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 120-21 (2004); ANGELL,
supra note 16, at 115-34; JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 292-94 (2004); and Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia Angell, Financial
Conflicts ofInterest in Biomedical Research, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 570 (1993) (analyzing the
effects of financial conflicts of interest on biomedical research and critiquing the policies used to
handle disclosure of such conflicts); see also Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices
that Create Conflicts ofInterest: A Policy Proposalfor Academic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429
(2006); Catherine D. DeAngelis, Editorial, Conflict of Interest and the Public Trust, 284 JAMA
2237 (2000) (introducing articles addressing the prevalence of conflicts of interest between
physicians and companies that financially support teaching and research, along with the effects of
this relationship on public trust of physicians). But for leading contrarians who argue that industry
relationships should be cultivated as essential and beneficial, see William M. Sage, Some Principles
Require Principals: Why Banning "Conflicts Of Interest" Won't Solve Incentive Problems in
Bedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007); Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic-
Industrial Research Relationships- Solving Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1060 (2005).
28 See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH UNDER IRC 501(c)(3)
(1986), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopico86.pdf.
29 See, e.g., Update on the Requirement for Instruction in the Responsible Conduct of
Research, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH (Nov. 24, 2009), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-
files/NOT-OD-10-019.html (discussing mandate for training in research integrity and the
responsible conduct of research, with links to other government resources detailing the required
topics); Taylor, supra note 25, at 398-401 (noting that researchers' legal data-sharing obligations
are related to fundamental ethical norms of science, reinforced by ethical force of promises of
social benefit made to research participants and research review boards).
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charters and policies. Academic scientists are expected to be in a position to
collaborate with private interests, but they must do so without putting personal
profit before the values espoused by their profession. This common sense
approach stands in stark contrast to the more extreme demands of some medical
leaders, which require complete disengagement from financial ties.
The problem is that public expectations and government policies no longer
permit a full account of professional virtue to exclude industry engagement. To
the contrary, according to both public expectation and policy changes, a virtuous
scientist is one who will engage with industry to bring a discovery to useful
fruition, yet retain her scientific independence and good judgment. This is law's
ethical challenge to physicians and scientists.
If not overgeneralized, the other two forms of influence on COI policy
provide some evidence that COIs can cause research lapses. First, there is a small
set of publicly noted COI cases whose specific facts purportedly support broad
conclusions about the negative effect of any industry relationship. Second,
analyses and meta-analyses demonstrate correlations between scientist behaviors
and industry relationships across populations, such as the statistical association
between positive industry sponsorship of clinical trials and published positive
trial results. Both forms of influence are contested, principally on the grounds
that research mishaps in these publically noted cases are due to factors other than
concurrent COIs and that population-based conclusions are best explained by
other variables. 30 To evaluate these conflicting claims, it is essential to
understand the nature of biomedical research and the opportunities for bias it
presents.
C. The Nuts and Bolts ofBiomedical Research
Regulatory approval by the FDA is not based on a complete understanding
of human biology or a universalized biochemistry. Instead, FDA approval
depends on artfully designed experiments to demonstrate safety and effectiveness
by showing that X is better than nothing for treating Y, with no other variables
confounding the results, as measured at particular times and with specified
measures.31
From the framing of hypotheses to the analysis and publication of results,
30 For a comprehensive, if one-sided, treatment of these arguments, see Sigrid Fry-Revere &
David Bjorn Malmstrom, More Regulation of Industry-Supported Biomedical Research: Are We
Asking the Right Questions?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 420 (2009).
31 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2008) (content and format of an application for FDA
approval to market a new drug); 21 C.F.R. §§ 58.120-.130 (2012) (protocol for and conduct of a
nonclinical laboratory study); FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES. (CDER), CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES. (CBER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EIO CHOICE OF CONTROL
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the research process is filled with strategic and tactical judgments about how a
scientific question is best answered. Such discretionary choices can be plausibly
defended, even when they might also appear as necessarily intended to
misrepresent, or inadvertently biased. In the notorious Vioxx debacle, for
example, Merck researchers had knowingly deleted three heart attacks that
occurred after a designated date end point. If those data had been included, the
Vioxx safety and efficacy analyses would have changed dramatically. 32 This
deletion was discovered only because electronic editing traces remained. When
revealed, the changes allegedly were justified by the general principle that one
should not manipulate endpoints. Regardless of the legitimacy of Merck's
rationale, this case illustrates the power of even one study parameter (out of
many) to affect the manner in which results and their implications are portrayed.
Biomedical research is ideally a combination of inquiry focused on a well-
defined question, using methods precise enough to control confounding
variables, and complemented by thoughtful, thorough analysis and sound
inferences. Biases often are associated with incorrect inferences, but biases go
much farther. Biases in a scientific study may be errors of selection (e.g., in
defining comparative groups), differences of measurement (e.g., perception
differences or instrument use), or intervention (e.g., systematic differential
treatment signals). 3 3 Some biases can be prevented easily, provided the study
structure does not thereby become unethical. 34 Thus, selection bias otherwise
affecting participant selection in a clinical trial, or participant-researcher
signaling, can be overcome by randomization and double-blinding. However,
these are not always ethical choices for ill participants for whom one research
arm is less than the standard of care. Some biases, such as those that affect the
selection and formulation of a scientific question, or biases that permeate every
stage of a study, may be very difficult to detect.35
There are two kinds of evidence that COls may create biases that affect
outcomes. First, scholars have noted a number of notorious cases of research
misconduct involving financially motivated investigators or institutions. David
Blumenthal, for example, describes how a research fellow at the Massachusetts
Eye and Ear Infirmary "benefited substantially from selling his holdings in a
private company established to market a new drug he was testing in clinical
32 See Gregory D. Curfman et al., Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al., "Comparison of
Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid
Arthritis ", 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2813 (2005).
33 See MASSIMO PIATELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON
RULE OUR MINDS (1994); James M. Hartman et al., Tutorials in Clinical Research: Part IV:
Recognizing and Controlling Bias, 112 LARYNGOSCOPE 23 (2002).
34 Consider a trial in which participants receive either a placebo or a test drug; it would be
unethical to enroll seriously ill patients who would otherwise receive a moderately effective
standard treatment.
35 See Hartman, supra note 33.
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trials." The fellow's unpublished work, however, showed the drug to be
ineffective and raised questions about participant harm. More recently, in a
contested and controversial case, the British Medical Journal asserted that the
researcher who did most to link autism with certain measles vaccines and bowel
disease committed scientific misconduct and hoped to profit from this academic
fraud through product sales by his private company.37 In these cases, proof of
wrongdoing is perceived as proof of the influence of financial incentives.
A second kind of bias is subtler. Misconduct coexists with a financial
interest, but the interest is not actually advanced through the misconduct, nor can
one find unambiguous evidence that the financial interest was the sole, or even a
"but for," cause of harm. In a widely publicized case, a young volunteer, Jesse
Gelsinger, with an effectively treated congenital liver ailment, died in a phase I
gene therapy trial following a massive immune response to the viral vector
used. 3 8 This clinical research trial was filled with mishaps, including a
miscalculation of the risks, trial design errors, and flawed and untimely reporting
of adverse events involving other participants. In addition, the decision to
conduct the phase I trial using healthy volunteers became controversial, given the
trial's substantial risks. A more accurate assessment of the risks might have led to
a decision to restrict the trial to those for whom existing therapies had failed-
unlike Jesse, whose condition had been stable prior to the research study.
Yet while these risk assessments were noted, it was not these factors that
captured the attention of Jesse Gelsinger's father and the public. Rather, it was
the fact that the investigator and the University of Pennsylvania had a substantial
equity stake in the company owning the rights to the therapy being tested.39
Reporters focused on this collaboration, even though it is not clear that financial
interests were pertinent to the clinical wrong that occurred. 4 0 For example, there
was no "smoking gun" evidence ever connecting dollars to improper shortcuts.
Still, the financial relationship seemed to provide, in a single phrase, a simple
explanation for how so much could have gone so wrong, through an imputation
36 David Blumenthal, Academic-Industry Relationships in the Life Sciences: Extent,
Consequences, and Management, 268 JAMA 3344-46 (1992).
37 Brian Deer, How the Vaccine Crisis Was Meant To Make Money, 342 BRIT. MED. J. 113
(2011).
38 See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 1999), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/l l/28/magazine/the-biotech-death-of-
jesse-gelsinger.html.
39 See, e.g., Patricia C. Kuszler, Biotechnology Entrepreneurship and Ethics: Principles,
Paradigms, and Products, 25 MED. & L. 491, 495 (2006) ("[L]apses in human subjects protection
remains an ever-present hazard. This has been exemplified by a series of high profile research
ethics scandals in the U.S.-the Jesse Gelsinger case in which a research subject in a gene-therapy
experiment died and it was alleged that the researchers' financial interest in the vector influenced
them to prematurely engage in the clinical trial that resulted in Mr. Gelsinger's death.").
40 Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of
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of bad character and overwhelming profit motives.41 Unlike the first kind of
misconduct case described above, the investigator and institution would have
gained if the therapy had been effective, but instead gained nothing from the
errors and flaws.42
Some industry proponents of academic partnerships argue that financial
relationships are seldom a material cause of misconduct and that in almost all
cases financial associations are absent or accidental.43 On its face, this is an
illogical argument, suggesting that from cases not involving financial interests
one can learn something definitive about the causal role of financial interests in
cases that do. Importantly, this contention also overlooks the first type of case
mentioned, where the form and evidence of misconduct in fact demonstrates the
salience of financial objectives. It is true that many cases of "bad science" or
participant harm do not involve financial COIs. But this fact alone does not prove
that the law and policy should not address financial COIs where they give rise to
improper incentives. This argument suggests only that there are other sources of
error beyond financial COIs.
Institutions need not accept this all-or-nothing characterization of the
potential for financial COIs to negatively impact research integrity, any more
than they need accept an all-or-nothing answer to the question of whether
industry payments to scientists contribute to innovation. Both questions have
41 See Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When it Comes to Clinical
Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423 (2001); Paul Gelsinger, Jesse's Intent: The Story ofJesse Gelsinger
as Told by His Father, available at http://www.jesse-gelsinger.com/jesses-intent2.html (last visited
Dec. 8, 2012).
42 The second kind of case has attracted particular attention because of the special delegated
authority to manage COls entrusted to both academic institutions and industry trial sponsors, to
which we shall return in discussing the regulatory structure. Can institutional committees perform
this function responsibly and fairly when, through its financial or intellectual property arms, the
institution has invested in the success of the tested technology or its corporate licensee or sponsor?
No one really knows the answer to this question or, more precisely, the variables on which an
affirmative or negative answer may depend. While there are many scandalous cases of institutions
acting on such interests to defeat academic values, there are also many cases in which institutions
have exercised bad judgment without financial investments in a sponsor. Thus, there are cases like
that of the Hospital for Sick Children in Canada, which hounded Dr. Nancy Olivieri for her release
of negative trial data, which a financially close sponsor had sought to suppress. See David Nathan
& David Weatherall, Academic Freedom in Clinical Research, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1368 (2002).
On the other hand, there are cases like Oklahoma's suppression of problems with a test melanoma
vaccine, in which both the IRB chair and investigators, without such a financial interest, sought to
avoid telling participants the truth about adverse effects and directly interfered in procedures. See
Mark Barnes & Patrik S. Florencio, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research:
The Problem of Institutional Conflicts, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390 (2002). And surely, there are
uncounted cases in which institutional investments are in effect walled off from review committees
like IRBs, either through deliberate confidentiality or simply by the entropic force of administrative
siloing within complex organizations, which is a daily feature of academic life.
43 For extensive, balanced discussion of cases of research misconduct disassociated from
industry relationships, see Susan M. Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific
Research, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 357 (1992).
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empirical dimensions that have not been explored. Isolated instances of harmful
COIs are useful to raise public awareness, but they are neither numerous nor
sufficiently diverse enough to ground all COI policy.
What makes the argument for some form of COI regulation compelling is
not these isolated cases, but rather reported patterns of association between
academic-industry collaboration and industry-favorable outcomes, such as above-
average positive results for published industry-sponsored clinical trials compared
to government- and non-profit-sponsored trials. In addition, the deeper insight
that research is filled with discretionary judgments, which financial interests may
conceivably influence, cannot reasonably be ignored. Finally, there is the
interesting fact that, while the pharmaceutical industry has demonstrably
succeeded in influencing researchers and physicians to some extent, the
industry's tools for achieving influence are few and selective.44 In short, the most
interesting fundamental fact is that data indicate an incomplete association,
suggesting that further analysis would reveal patterns worth exploring
empirically for their differential assessment and remediation.
To address each of these points individually, first, research bias is often
subtle. Compare this to discretionary prescribing of approved drugs for off-label
uses, in which even small gifts can induce physicians to write these prescriptions,
through the generation of good feeling and perhaps an unconscious desire on the
part of the physician not to disappoint a pharmaceutical representative. This is
not an outright quid pro quo exchange, as those affected are often completely
unaware of this influence. 45 Notably, no comparable study exists to assess the
impact of COIs on research across a population.
Second, industry has been selective in how it pays for influence. Some of the
most egregious examples of bias arise from the arrangements that are most
lacking in academic contribution to innovation: speakers' bureaus, in which a
hired physician delivers an industry-prepared, pro-product talk for a significant
stipend; ghostwritten manuscripts of industry-favorable clinical trial reports or
articles in reputable journals to which physicians or scientists attach their name
and reputation; studies that are so biased in design they would not pass
independent scientific review; and reports of data that misrepresent clinical trial
results to such an extent that the real conclusions oppose those that the company
wishes to represent as truth.46 These examples confirm the reality that some such
arrangements are negative, while at the same time highlighting the need to
distinguish positive from negative collaboration arrangements.
Third, there is extensive literature concerning bias in reporting and
publishing data, which demonstrates that industry sponsorship is correlated,
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 16; Angell, supra note 2; Catherine DeAngelis & Philip
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albeit incompletely, with positive reported findings and a systematically
disproportionate number of proindustry publications. These biases are in part
correlated with scientific journals' own financial interests in reprints and
advertising.4 7 Advocates for industry have argued that this is because industry
wisely selects potential drugs and test compounds before commencing costly
clinical trials. But studies demonstrate, in some cases, significant industry
suppression of data relevant to safety-and-efficacy determinations.48 Indeed,
some sponsors' reports to mandated public trial result registries show, even
across small samples, inconsistent data, and data deviations between published
reports and registry information from the same sponsors. 4 9 Finally, apart from
industry relationships, overwhelming evidence links scientists' personal stake in
invention proceeds to delayed publication and reduced data sharing.50 But "links"
is a soft term, denoting an incomplete association; thus instead of demonstrating
that all academic-industry collaborations are venal, this evidence, too, invites us
to discover the circumstances in which the association is strong and the
circumstances where the association is weak or nonexistent.
The conclusion one ought to draw is not that all academic-industry
collaborations should be avoided because all involve a conscious lapse from
academic independence. It is, rather, that there are grounds to distinguish among
collaborations. Some, like speakers' bureaus and ghostwritten manuscripts,
should be prohibited because of their obviously minimal contribution to
innovation as weighed against their contribution to bias. Grounds for regulation
of others exist to the extent that financial interests may, if improperly structured,
operate on any medical researcher, consciously or unconsciously, to short-circuit
ethical standards and technical quality, rather than reinforcing these values.
Addressing the moral hazards of these incentives is not an impossible task,
but is merely one that is unfamiliar to biomedical researchers and doctors.
Compare a familiar, time-tested and ubiquitous example: customers pay
construction contractors a certain amount up front, but they make final payment
contingent on satisfactory results. In medical research this is an incurable COI. In
construction it is not; it is a desirable, routine incentive to drive high-quality
results. Of course, research is not construction. But both share a reliance on
47 See Andreas Lundh et al., Conflicts of Interest at Medical Journals: The Influence of
Industry-Supported Randomised Trials on Journal Impact Factors and Economy: A Cohort Study,
7 PLoS MED. e1000354 (2010); Editorial, Increased Responsibility and Transparency in an Era of
Increased Visibility, 7 PLoS MED. e1000364 (2010).
48 See, e.g., Fiona Godlee & Elizabeth Loder, Missing Clinical Trial Data: Setting the Record
Straight, 341 BRIT. MED. J. c5641 (2010) (editorial introducing a British Medical Journal volume
with a cross-section of pieces devoted to this subject); see also Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., The
Uncertainty Principle in Industry-Sponsored Research, 356 LANCET 635 (2000).
49 Kerry Dwan et al., Comparison of Protocols and Registry Entries to Published Reports for
Randomised Controlled Trials, 19 COCHRANE DATABASE SYsT. REV. 1 (2011).
50 Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Data from a National
Survey, 287 JAMA473 (2002); Taylor, supra note 25, at 398-401.
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trusted expertise at every stage of an elaborate step-by-step process. They also
share standards governing every stage whose primary focus is on how to make
professional choices. It is primarily through the internalization of these standards
by professionals in the field that they are given force. Violation of these
standards can lead to misdeeds and abuse of trust in research, the death of
research participants, and in construction, for example, a fire-resistant building
that is consumed by flames in an instant. Institutions use externally codified
standards and inspections to address the moral hazard of result-dependent
payments, and they scrutinize payments that would induce corner cutting. The
law provides homeowners with special rights in case a deal with a contractor
goes wrong, and it strives to increase transparency in these relationships. This
approach should inform our debate about industry-academic COIs in health care,
as well.
As noted earlier, there are no data documenting management of COIs, an
absence that ought to signal that academic and industry biomedical research has
built a regulatory structure without a factual foundation. Yet, already datasets are
available that, if correlated, could provide important insights into how the
structure of incentives, compensation, and other terms affect whether a particular
collaboration reinforces quality standards or undercut them. COI evidence should
lead us to explore the variety of ways in which collaborations may be structured
and the richness of terms that may be material- both to actual value in
promoting innovation and negative influence on research integrity. Perhaps
surprisingly, current literature on COIs fails to describe this existing array. The
next Section suggests ways in which this gap may be filled.
D. Context, Terms and Structure: Collaboration Variables Material to COI
Regulation
The argument thus far traces two unreconciled imperatives: that academic
scientists and physicians must collaborate with industry and that they must avoid
conflicts of interest. Also, I have maintained that value-based arguments
condemning all collaboration misread the ethical challenge to collaborate well;
moreover, these arguments over-read the COI evidence to proscribe any
relationship. So far, indirect evidence adduced for material variation is present
when statistical associations for the whole category are less than 100%; direct
evidence is manifest in the list of clearly malignant collaborations, like speakers'
bureaus, ghostwriting arrangements, and payments for referrals and orders. But it
is research agreements and consulting agreements that create the collaborations at
the center of academic-industry relationships. This section is therefore devoted to
demonstrating how the terms of these agreements affect the discretion that
researchers retain and the existence and force of a COI. An overview of the
categories of terms that might plausibly influence COIs leads to four hypothetical
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in these hypotheticals are composites of documented instances of COIs.
Industry relationships with academic researchers are common, but their
details are little known. When the researcher is retained as an "investigator"
under FDA regulations, the arrangement is called a "sponsored research
agreement" and includes the researcher's affiliated academic institution. But
companies often seek advice from academic researchers through formal scientific
advisory boards or in their capacity to serve as subject-matter experts. These
arrangements are embodied in consulting agreements. While consulting
agreements address many of the same issues as sponsored research agreements,
they often do so differently. Sponsored research agreements must include precise
descriptions of academic researchers' responsibilities. However, consulting
agreements may be more vague about what is expected of the researcher.
Imprecision often raises questions about whether the payments are really for
another purpose, such as influencing a physician researcher to prescribe the
company's product or encouraging a researcher involved in company research to
report favorable outcomes. Some terms, such as intellectual property ownership
and confidentiality, raise special problems where their scope seems to overlap
with academic work. Applied literally, these terms may seize that academic work
and assign it to industry or "gag" a researcher's ability to publish results.s'
It is important to understand at the outset the potential advantages and
disadvantages of such arrangements. On the one hand, they are a vehicle both for
disinterested expertise to influence corporate judgments and industry researchers
to solicit a second opinion on matters with significant corporate financial
implications. Indeed, through a payment structure independent of outcomes,
consulting agreements may crucially insulate such research judgments from
internal financial pressures faced by corporate scientists and executives. Industry
and academia often have different perspectives on the significance of discoveries,
and each may hold confidential data or rights to materials whose synergistic
exchange would benefit knowledge and society. The translation from basic or
medical science to industry clinical applications is often a complex one, where
the scientific and clinical implications of alternative courses are unclear. The
collaboration of researchers with industry is often useful to ensure that sufficient
weight is given to noneconomic factors and to avoid costly mistakes, duplicated
work, and misjudgments about who may benefit clinically from a discovery.
Academic researchers may find that industry relationships help motivate their
independent work in two ways: seeing a discovery benefit a patient may provide
personal satisfaction, and consulting agreements may allow researchers, who
51 See Nathan & Weatherall, supra note 42, at 1368 (noting that a company's effort to
suppress and punish doctor's "ethical" publication of negative trial data in violation of a
confidentiality provision led to successful pressure on the doctor's eminent academic hospital
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would otherwise seek more profitable careers, to remain in academia.
On the other hand, if consulting income is contingent on researcher actions
that otherwise ought to be performed at the discretion of the researcher, or if
these payments motivate the researcher to please industry through favorable
research outcomes, the researcher's independence might be jeopardized. This
could have consequences ranging from bias in how research is conducted or
reported, to harms to human participants, through understated risks or trial
designs where shortcuts unconsciously skew data in favor of success.52
The next question, therefore, is what contractual terms could present
challenges to researcher independence through the behavior they incentivize.
Consulting agreements reflect many of the same concerns as industry-sponsored
research agreements." In this case, however, the spine around which all limbs
are arranged is not a research protocol and set of FDA regulations, but rather a
contractual definition of "services" the researcher will provide to the company,
which, once formally defined, will play out functionally in numerous contract
sections. Usually, contracts note that "payment will be for services" and mutual
indemnification by the researcher will be for claims "arising from services."
These agreements mandate confidentiality related to all information received or
created by the researcher that "relates to" or "arises out of" services, and the
intellectual property assigned to the company will include any legally protectable
materials relating to, or arising from, the researcher's services, as well as all
intellectual property that makes use of confidential information.
"Relates to" is a dangerously broad phrase that recurs in these contracts. It
implies a topical subject-matter comparison, rather than a causal relation,
frequently encompassing the very academic work that has made the researcher of
52 Under the model common to academic medicine, senior researchers are explicitly mentors
for junior researchers. In addition, because of their roles as peer reviewers on NIH grant review
committees and advisers on FDA advisory committees, their work and views influence many
aspects of industry and academic research, including regulatory decisions by the FDA and EPA; the
evaluation of biotech companies and their initiatives; the determination of who among their peers
gets funded; and the public perception of science and medicine. If interaction with industry skews a
researcher's judgment towards a particular company or approach, the ripple effects can magnify the
impact of this influence.
53 Sponsored research agreements are complex, addressing many aspects of regulatory
compliance, funding and oversight. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., FORUM ON DRUG DISCOVERY,
DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSLATION: TEMPLATE FOR CLINICAL TRIAL AGREEMENTS (2009), available
at http://www.iom.edu/-/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Research/DrugForum/April27-28/
Template CTA%2042209.ashx. The set of provisions that will affect academic independence is
varied but discrete, including, for example, limits on publication, privately held intellectual
property rights in academic discoveries, preservation of a researcher's medical discretion to remove
a participant from a study, and payment structure. Suspect payment structures might include
incentive payments to recruit fast, special payments for rapid publication, and side payments to
staff to foster a sense of priority for that sponsor's studies. Because sponsored research agreements
always involve the researcher's academic institution, to which all payments are directed, it is easier
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interest to the company as a consultant. At the same time, the duties of
assignment, confidentiality, and even indemnification are absolute, regardless of
the degree of company contribution of information or ideas to the researcher's
discoveries and inventions. Whether the contract involves a 1% contribution by
the sponsoring company or a 99% contribution, by the company makes no
difference. All discoveries belong to the company, and a little company
information makes any discovery confidential and non-publishable, at the
company's behest. This combines with the fact that industry services descriptions
are nearly always vague and overbroad. If the principal investigator is interested
in genetics, all of her NIH-funded research is in genetics, and the collaborating
company is a start-up interested in genetics, then services will likely be described
as "advising on genetics." A typical researcher is not likely to object to this
description, assuming that it will allow him or her greater flexibility.
Consider the breadth of what is legally protectable-copyrights, patents,
trade secrets, disclosures capable of being enjoined-and the result is the
company proposal in almost all cases. The law prohibits the researcher from
publishing academic manuscripts that overlap in topic. The researcher does not
own the copyright, and the data may be confidential. The rights in discoveries
have been exported from the academy, a world of communitarian scientific
values 54 and competing Bayh-Dole incentives,5 5 to a company with obligations
primarily to its own profitability. This does not mean that companies abandon all
discretion and enforce these rights regardless of their costs. To the company,
continued academic work (funded by the NIH, not the company) and continued
publications favorable to their cause will be useful. But when the stakes are high
enough, companies use these rights, and in the short run they often "win."
Unfortunately, a company's economic stakes are often directly proportional to
the scientific and clinical importance of a discovery. For example, an iron-
chelation compound used to mitigate thalassemia and a method for assessing the
actual effectiveness of AIDS antiretroviral therapies each became embroiled in
such company action.s5
The exclusivity of an agreement for the researcher might also plausibly
affect the existence and strength of a COI. The researcher's financial eggs will all
be in one basket, and the negotiating leverage behind the company demands
increases if the researcher is barred from comparable opportunities during and
after the consulting arrangement. Exclusivity can be achieved indirectly through
corporate ownership and control of a researcher's key inventions, or a founder's
54 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
56 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (2011) (holding that Roche's ownership
through a private assignment of an academic method to assess AIDS antiretroviral therapies trumps
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role in a start-up based on the researcher's invention with deferred and contingent
vesting of optimally valuable stock options. A more direct method is through a
"noncompete" clause. Noncompetes vary in duration, geography, and scope of
the prohibition, but may go so far as to bar industry sponsorship of all of the
researcher's academic work except by the company. Conversely, multiple
consulting relationships will decrease economic concentration, although their
overall COI impact will still depend on other factors. Note the counterintuitive
result: other things being equal, researchers with more consulting relationships
may be more resistant to the blandishments or pressure of any one company.
Finally, to illustrate the imprecision of payment registries, it deserves
emphasis that payment terms, not just payment amounts, vary. Compensation can
take the form of a one-time transfer, a per diem dispersal, or a more periodic
payment schedule. If compensation is in securities, it is likely to be in
unregistered founder's or common stock for companies that have not engaged in
an initial public offering (IPO) or in options or warrants. The latter are most
common if the researcher's role allows participation in a stock ownership plan,
but they may be offered either by publicly traded or privately held corporations.
Similarly, the vesting of rights in securities may be directly or indirectly
contingent on results of the research. A vesting that depends on enrollment of the
first patient in a phase III trial does not explicitly require that data be favorable,
but a drug will not get to phase III unless safety and efficacy data from phases I
and II are favorable. Contract options create a layered COI, in which the
company must have reached a certain form of acknowledged public success,
whether through registration and an IPO or through an increase in the publicly
traded price above the option purchase price.
This does not mean that securities are all alike and that all security
arrangements create greater COIs than cash transfers. If the payment is twice the
scientist's annual salary and is paid tomorrow, then the researcher might well
prefer it to 30% of a 0.001 cent-per-share company that is ten years or more from
an IPO. Or she might not. Even this comparison may be too coarse. If the cash
deal comes with noncompetes, and the equity one does not, so that the researcher
can consult for seven companies, diversify her risks, and multiply her benefits,
which will she prefer? Or, to put the matter differently, which one creates the
"greater" COI? To discuss the potential interplay of these terms in life-like
transactions, the next section examines four COI cases in some contractual detail.
CASE 1: Amount of Payment
Dr. Researcher is a department chair at a medical school and could easily
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pharmaceutical corporation. Instead, he has engaged in a consulting agreement to
advise a private company on the development of an emergency antidote for
adolescent suicidal drug overdoses. For his services, he will receive $15,000,
paid in advance, for two years of service. The agreement waives all equity and
additional fees in return for a right of first refusal for his institution, which would
allow a junior doctor who he is mentoring to act as principal investigator and
conduct the first clinical trial. He sees the antidote as a breakthrough.
Case 1 undermines the concept that a payment registry accurately reflects
problematic COIs. It shows that even a large compensation sum, like $15,000,
does not mean that there is a COI that will harm research behavior. Instead, this
case is an example of an academic leader significantly discounting his high rate
in order to test whether a novel therapy is effective. He is optimizing the benefit
of the therapy for the target patients because they are a population to whom he
has a long, clear record of commitment. In addition, he properly seeks to mentor
a junior clinician scientist. The fact that the compensation is advance-paid means
that he will be compensated whether his advice is favorable or challenging to the
company. While the possibility of a clinical trial, with attendant revenue, might
suggest the presence of an incentive to distort the results in the company's favor
going forward, the incentive to engage in a clinical trial that would fail is small.
Yet the incentive to engage in a sound clinical trial is probably substantial.
CASE 2: Scope of Discretion
Dr. Researcher is a Founder of Progressive Pharma, a pharmaceutical
corporation. His $15,000 per year consulting agreement as chair of Progressive
Pharma's scientific advisory board (SAB) gives him a voice to object if
Progressive seeks, based solely on business concerns, to terminate trials on
several drugs he invented. Further, this money empowers the SAB to allocate
15% of company research funding among understudied diseases. Progressive
Pharma, styling itself as "the ethical start-up," made these concessions partly in
return for Dr. Researcher's waiver of start-up equity, partly because of the
scientific and ethical profile he hopes Progressive Pharma will build, and partly
because of the availability of FDA grants for understudied diseases.
Case 2 is an example of how consulting agreements in association with
licenses of university-assigned inventions by the scientist might contain terms
designed to protect the technology from business choices that, in the scientist's
view, would unethically interfere with the process by which an important new
technology reaches patients. Companies are loath to give scientists any influence
on commercial decisions. Here, the approach succeeded because a traditional
scientific function, sitting on a scientific advisory board, became a quality-
control function. The scientist's commitment to this is evident in his sacrifice of
his equity stake in a company developing a promising invention. Yet a payment
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registry likely will not capture these nuances.
CASE 3: Stock Options and Exclusivity
Dr. Researcher is a groundbreaking translational researcher, recruited at
great expense by his academic institution, and fully funded by the government.
Peer reviewers consider him among the most celebrated researchers in his field.
He enters into a consulting agreement with a start-up pharmaceutical company,
Mini-Progressive, for whom he agrees to consult exclusively. The agreement's
noncompete bar him from accepting other industry sponsorships for institutional
research or collaborating with other companies in his institutional role. His
compensation is a series of low dollar-options, which will vest in slowly
increasing proportions over a five-year period, with a "bubble" at the end of 50%
of the options vesting. Their current value, based on liquidation value of the
company after debt repayment, is zero. However, in ten years if Mini-Progressive
can keep its research costs low and foster its most promising developments, the
options might eventually be worth millions of dollars.
Case 3 could be a truly pernicious example of an academic-industry COI.
This scientist has foreclosed not only his own future consulting options, but also
his collaborative options with the industry in the course of his academic
appointment, for personal gain. Indeed, through not diversifying his own
consulting risks, he is now highly and solely invested in the company's success.
The company wants to know which research projects to target, information he
can likely share, given his expertise and the access the NIH will grant him as a
reviewer of others' confidential applications. The company wishes to lower its
research costs, which he can do by ensuring that his NIH-funded research is
focused on topics that will benefit the company-and perhaps even suggesting
that he collaborate with the company in just the sort of translational manner that
some current programs might celebrate. The compelling story around that
collaboration, and perhaps a management plan of occasional peer review of his
pre-submission manuscripts, could allow it to be misunderstood as a public
model for the resolution of competing concerns. Worse, the agreement might
completely evade registry disclosure based on the cash value of the securities.
Yet peer review of his manuscripts, apart from its own limits, given that
reviewers are dependent on manuscript assertions for facts, will never penetrate
what could be going on: direction of his NIH-funded research and private transfer
of its most novel and interesting results to one company, for its and his own
benefit. Peer reviewers cannot expose the researcher's exclusive collaboration
with one private partner, rather than more generally with industry for public
benefit or the use of not-for-profit, tax-exempt resources for personal gain of a
researcher and the for-profit enterprise in which he has investments. In this sense,
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academic goals with profit-seeking applications. The latter are acceptable goals
in the private sector, but they are mismatched for government-funded research
operating under different rules and premises. Those scenarios are merely
possibilities unless confirmed by investigation. Investigation is warranted not by
some offensive pre-judgment of the researcher's unvirtue but by a pattern of
circumstances: the alignment of terms already contrary to the primacy of
academic obligations with personal profit and company leverage, the
arrangement's exclusivity, the huge pay-off possible from violations the
researcher can make almost impossible to detect, and the gap between modest
academic salaries and industry's greater payscales, bonuses and stock packages,
despite a common professorial belief that academic qualifications, expertise, and
contributions are more significant.
CASE 4: Launching a Start-up Company
Dr. Researcher's suggestive papers that a newly identified "power molecule"
could dramatically expedite wound healing have attracted the attention of several
investors, who approach him about creating a start-up company around his
discovery. His consulting agreement includes scientific supervision of the
company's validation experiments, as well as being the "scientific voice" to other
potential investors concerning the merits of his discovery. Those investors will
contribute the cash necessary for the first two years of development, projected to
require a high "burn rate." Discussions are amicable, and meetings with the
investors go well. Soon, the company asks Dr. Researcher to leave academic
work to become the company's Chief Scientific Officer, at a salary three times
that of his academic salary and supplemented by stock and options that will, if
the company succeeds as projected, be valued at over $10 million. During these
discussions, Dr. Researcher continues his research, which is partly funded by the
NIH and partly by the company. From his expanded research funding, he is able
to publish increasingly glowing accounts of the function of the "power
molecule." He cites the intellectual property and confidentiality provisions of his
consulting agreement to justify his refusal to make his reagents available to other
scientists interested in replicating his work.
Case 4 has many of the indicators of a successful handoff of an important
discovery to industry. In fact, it is what some in industry would feel is their
"dream case," in which reagents, inventions, know-how, and personal credibility
are all leant to the company. This arrangement is frequently the one that
pharmaceutical companies strive to establish, yet it also has danger signals
throughout. Marketing is no part of a scientist's special expertise, and the
company ought to be seeking independent validation of his claims, rather than
putting him in a position where he is expected to invalidate them if required but
has every financial reason not to. In short, his actual contributions to innovation
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from such consulting (distinguished from the company's interest in acquiring
investors) are likely limited and undercut by competing concerns. The
combination of interests and exclusivity bear investigation for their effect on
research integrity.
While new industry payment registries available to the public would treat all
these cases in a categorical manner, by disclosing only the fact of a financial
interest or relationship for whatever negative inference the public would draw, it
is important to note that these are in fact very different cases. Equally important
are the terms of the parties' agreements and whether the academic research
institution employing the researcher is included. The incentive effects that
corporate support might create are subject to variable mitigation through both
means. If the institution is a direct payee as employer of the scientist, a transfer to
the scientist of risk-sharing dollars dependent on research outcomes would be
much more toxic than a guaranteed institutional salary arrangement that research
revenue simply helps offset. Contrast this to direct payment arrangements, with
no institutional intermediation of dollars. But even without a financial
arrangement, the institution may still be an important player in addressing COI
risks if the researcher has a medical staff or research staff appointment at an
academic hospital, a non-employment relationship unique to health law. The
appointment implies some oversight and watchfulness by the hospital of the
researchers' qualifications and work, and it links the researcher to hospital-based
systems for research approval. This could link research incidents and outcomes
with a hospital's ongoing, highly detail-observant, legally mandated systems to
assess and improve patient safety. 5
Later, this Article will recommend collection of data on the multiplicity of
arrangements and their COI effects. For now, coupling the sources and text from
the COI section with the discussion of collaboration arrangements yields the
following variables to examine in a multivariate analysis:
1. the precise scope of a researcher's industry services and their necessity in
innovative progress;
2. the form, amount, and structure of compensation, including its independence
from specific results;
57 Patrick L. Taylor, Overseeing Innovative Therapy Without Mistaking It for Research: A
Function-Based Model Based on Old Truths, New Capacities, and Lessons from Stem Cells, 38 J.L.
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3. the degree to which the researcher may deviate from corporate interests (e.g.,
in publishing negative results or un-enrolling a participant for whom the
burdens of participation are severe) without financial or other penalty;
4. the collaborative elements, or their absence, indicative of mutuality and
public benefit, including mutual availability of reagents, data and rights;
5. the existence of other researcher motivations, such as the desire to shift
employment from academia to industry, the desire to share in product profits,
or a longstanding personal commitment to resolving specific diseases or
aiding specified patients;
6. the areas of research judgment that the researcher has the discretion to
influence, namely, their scope and impact;
7. corrective forces on the exercise of that discretion, such as guidance
sufficiently clear to create standards, the role of collaborators without
conflicts and their contributions, the strength, independence, and insight of
oversight bodies, and the form of institutional involvement, if any;
8. the degree to which the academic scientist's services and inventions are
nonexclusive and available to others; the degree to which the scientist
herself, in her academic and non-company work, is affected by noncompetes
and intellectual property provisions;
9. the degree to which the researcher's results will be confidential, affected by
publication clauses, confidentiality provisions, exclusivity terms, and
whether there are tacit agreements to funnel academic discoveries solely or
first to the company, rather than to prompt publication;
10. the local social context and compliance environment in which the research
will occur, and the clarity and force of its shared expectations.
Discerning the variety among collaborations is the key to identifying those
that best reconcile genuine contributions to innovation with minimizing bias risk.
The Article turns now to the COI regulatory structure, to assess its capacity to
perform that task.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MIRAGE AND THE MYTH OF REGULATION
Industry collaboration is necessary. But due to the varieties of collaboration
terms, the likelihood of a COI will vary. This Article now discusses an important
question: What is the capacity of administrators under current regulations to
distinguish among collaborations, based on their value to innovation and their
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bias risk? The answer will sweep wider than the question, for the bases for
incapacity will affect far more than the ability to distinguish: it will undercut the
legitimacy of the regulations and the soundness of any of their principles.
The regulations do not reflect distinctions among industry arrangements, nor
do they equip administrators to make sound judgments about bias risk and how to
mitigate it. No comprehensive factual inquiry preceded these regulations, and,
according to the Institute of Medicine (IOM),58 no factual inquiry has been
undertaken to assess their effectiveness. Nonetheless, grants and personal
property rights can be removed without any due process, under a standard
dependent entirely on unavailable facts, with no check on the qualifications or
biases of institutional adjudicators to whom the government decision is broadly
delegated. There is no required record; no right to counsel; no right to confront
witnesses or review adverse evidence; no possibility for any person affected,
such as a research subject, to intervene; no whistleblower protection; no
requirement for a written decision, let alone a reasoned one; and no right to an
appeal, by either an investigator or anyone affected by an actual COI, whether a
colleague or a research subject in a trial so affected. The regulations thus omit
traditional methods for epistemic soundness (such as qualified and unbiased
adjudicators) and self-correction (such as transparent written decisions and
possible appeals) that might otherwise have helped make up for the absence of
empirical inquiry that ought to precede any legal regulation.
There is no comprehensive regulatory system for addressing COIs in
research or even across all federal agencies. For COIs, there are regulations
promulgated in 1995 by the NIH, and very similar ones by the National Science
Foundation, governing academic recipients of their funds for research. FDA
regulations require industry (and other) funders of research, who will be applying
for approval to market a drug or device, to collect certain COI information. In
addition, while there is no law or regulation that requires Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs) to address COIs arising in clinical research, the Office of Human
Research Protections has issued guidance on what IRBs might consider, if they
choose to look at COIs. 5 9
There are also five categories of self-regulation. First, the voluntary
accrediting body for human research protection programs requires institutions to
maintain COI management systems, with definitions that track the regulatory
requirements. But this body does not assess the function or efficacy of such
58 See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
59 The latter is well summarized in I. Glenn Cohen, Administrative Developments: New
Human Subject Research Guidelines for IRBs, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305 (2000). The primary
significance of that guidance is in recommending that IRBs review COls, including for a set of
factors encompassing the range of FDA definitions and a subset of the AAMC ones I shall discuss
below. It is an influential, important document. However, for purposes of evaluating its strengths
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systems. 6 0 Second, the PhRMA Code of 2009, a pharmaceutical industry
association code, specifies that consulting should be for an appropriate purpose,
compensated reasonably, and reflected in a written agreement that ensures it is
for actual services. 6' Third, various professional medical societies have put out
specialty-specific suggested guidelines. One example is the investment-
prohibitory rules that the American Society for Gene Therapy published in the
wake of the death of Jesse Gelsinger.6 2 More commonly, rather than prohibiting
whole categories of financial interest or relationship, guidelines recite both the
importance of physician involvement with industry, and objectivity; exhort good
judgment; and suggest that COIs always be disclosed to others such as
colleagues, journals, and trainees, as if the issue were solely appearance, and later
disclosure could address earlier unconscious bias effects. These guidelines
parallel the requirements of journals mandating disclosure, but do not otherwise
prohibit COIs or indicate that they have been disclosed to peer reviewers or that
they have in any way affected the evaluation of a manuscript. 6 3 Fourth, a special
committee of the Institute of Medicine published a lengthy report in 2009, whose
principal objectives were to establish and document the pervasiveness of
industry's interrelationship with medicine and medical education and make
specific recommendations. 4  The report ultimately articulated important
principles for evaluating COI policies, including treating people fairly under
transparent policies. Yet distinguishing based on evidence among unlike cases
was not an achievement of this report. Fifth, the AAMC, which had elevated
local control over other values, sought to bring order to the evident institutional
chaos through three major reports and recommendations with respect to clinical
research and a data symposium directed to establishing, for once and for all, that
COIs can cause bias. However, there are inherent limitations on addressing COI
issues without data. The resulting elegant policies were procedural not
substantive, did not improve the epistemic competence of COI adjudications by
rooting them in a body of established knowledge about differential bias risks, and
60 Human research protection programs are institutional or corporate systems for participant
protection and ethical and scientific review, consisting, for example, of an IRB, investigator
training, and scientific review committees. For more information about the accrediting body, the
American Association of Human Research Protection Programs (AAHRPP), and its COI
requirements, see AAHRPP, www.aahrpp.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
61 For a concise and penetrating treatment of the PhRMA Code, in the context of those laws,
see Howard L. Dorfman, The 2009 Revision to the PhRMA Code on Interactions with Healthcare
Professionals: Challenges and Opportunities for the Pharmaceutical Industry in the Age of
Compliance, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361 (2009).
62 Am. Soc'y Gene & Cell Therapy, Policy Statement on Financial Conflict of Interest in
Clinical Research (April 5, 2000), available at http://www.asgct.org/position-statements/conflict
ofinterest.php.
63 As a reviewer for several scientific journals, I can attest that I have never been made aware
of the COIs of manuscript authors. Some scientific journals require submission of a COI disclosure
with the initial manuscript submission, unlike law reviews, which require none.
64 IOM REPORT, supra note 3.
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translated the complexity of potential arrangements into a single presumption
against, rebuttable by compelling necessity. The beneficial cases, Cases 1 and 2,
above, would likely be disallowed under that standard, while Case 4, a
problematic case, would likely pass through untouched since the researcher's
share of licensing revenue would not be considered conflicting, the uniqueness of
his knowledge would justify his consulting relationship during the period he
remained an academic and, for a simple reason applicable as well to problematic
Case 3, the research involved is probably not clinical research.
A. The NIH Standard6 5
Since their adoption in 1995, the COI regulations applicable to NIH-funded
research as a component of the Public Health Service have been amended only
once, on August 25, 2011.66 The amendments were focused and significant;
where applicable, both former and new standards will be noted below. But the
amendments did not address the most significant criticisms of the regulations that
this Article will make.
The NIH standard for COIs always has been short and deceptively simple in
appearance. Its purpose is to "promote[] objectivity in research by establishing
standards to ensure there is no reasonable expectation that the design, conduct, or
reporting of research funded under PHS [Public Health Service] grants or
cooperative agreements will be biased by any conflicting financial interest of an
Investigator." 6 7 It imposes no direct obligations on conflicted investigators, but
institutions receiving such funds must have a system under which investigators
are required to disclose to officials designated by the institution a listing of "the
investigator's significant financial interests (and those of the investigator's
spouse and dependent children)."68 The institutional official(s) will review those
disclosures and determine whether any of the reported financial interests "could
directly and significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting" of the
research. 69 The recent amendments changed the definition of Significant
Financial Interests from those that might reasonably appear affected by the
research to those related to an investigator's institutional roles-a much more
objective standard, although one which goes far beyond research integrity
matters.
If an official determines that a reported interest "could directly and
65 See Objectivity in Research, 24 NIH GUIDE (July 14, 1995); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601-.607
(2011).
66 Responsibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which Public
Health Service Funding is Sought and Responsible Prospective Contractors, 76 Fed Reg. 53256
(Aug. 25, 2011).
67 42 C.F.R. § 50.601 (2011).
68 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2011).
69 Id.
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significantly affect" the research, the official must report this to the NIH, within
sixty days or before funds are expended, and ensure that the institution has taken
unspecified measures to manage, reduce, or eliminate the COI. 70 Under the pre-
amendment regulations the degree and manner of conflict reduction need not be
disclosed, and potential management strategies noted in the regulation are neither
mandatory nor exclusive. Through careful drafting, there is not even a conflict to
report unless and until an institutional official determines there is one. Reporting
is limited to cases of COIs as determined by the institution.' From reporting
alone, the NIH will not know if an institution is biased towards under-
determinations.
Before the October 2011 amendments, the government did not receive notice
of the relationship of the interest to the research and the management strategy
adopted. There was no requirement that the institution itself assess the adequacy
and appropriateness of any of its determinations; now, however, the revised
regulations require the institution to perform a retrospective review of cases of
noncompliance. The regulations give COI officials and committees significant
power over researchers. For example, the regulation states that institutions may
limit the investigator's participation in the research, monitor the investigator, and
direct the investigator to divest personal assets (including assets belonging to the
spouse or dependent children). The institutional official may direct the institution
and investigator to terminate their industry contracts.
Society expects administrative agencies with such power to be restrained and
protected by a familiar set of adjudicatory requirements. But this is not the case.
Institutional determinations need not be made based on data. Indeed, the word
"data" does not appear anywhere in the regulatory mandate itself. No
qualifications are specified for the "official(s)" who are institutionally designated
to make determinations. Furthermore, there is no protection of the COI official or
committee from external or institutional pressure; no protection for third parties,
such as concerned employees, from investigator retaliation; and no protected or
privileged investigation requirement that the institutional official have access to
other data sources within the institution, such as institutional COI reports directed
to other purposes, like abuse of management authority or position for personal
gain, or databases of noncompliance with IRB human subject protection
processes. There is no requirement that the official be unbiased or that the
institution identifies and avoids any adjudicatory conflicts of interest it has, such
as its interest in grant revenue. The indefinite NIH standard of potential
significance need not be translated into any more concrete specifications,
whether prospective, as rules restraining unbridled discretion and providing
notice to investigators, or retrospective, as "case law," to explain determinations
to investigators and the public.
70 42 C.F.R. § 50.605 (2011); 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2011) (sixty-day mandate).
71 42 C.F.R. § 50.605 (2012).
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Typically agencies also labor under requirements that ensure accountability,
ranging from creation of a specified record, to an appellate review process. But
not here. There is no requirement for a written decision; no requirement for any
oral or written record of the proceedings; no investigator right to appeal
(although the institution may appeal if the NIH sanctions it for not doing
enough); no right to counsel; no required oversight or operational relationship to
executive management, the board of trustees or directors or any operating
component of the university or hospital; no required advisory board, let alone a
board sufficiently inclusive to detect bias, promote legitimacy, give voice to
ranging perspectives and approaches, audit the programs' fairness and
effectiveness, or require and oversee any aspect of quality improvement.
For this purpose, a "significant financial interest" before the 2011
amendments meant "anything of monetary value, including but not limited to,
salary or other payments for services (e.g., consulting fees or honoraria); equity
interests (e.g., stocks, stock options or other ownership interests); and intellectual
property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights and royalties from such rights)." Certain
exempted categories include "salary, royalties and other remuneration from [an]
institution"; outside payments to the investigator, spouse, and dependent children
that are not "expected to" exceed $10,000 in the subsequent twelve months; and
equity interests, similarly aggregated for spouse and dependent children, that are
worth less than $10,000 by "reference to public prices or other fair market
value." 72 Therefore, note the following: First, even where proposed research
would definitely and dramatically affect the value of an investigator's royalty
interests from university licensed technology, the COI is ignored. Second, all
equity interests are pooled as if identical in the risks they pose, except that
unregistered securities are sui generis in not benefitting from the $10,000
threshold applicable to cash and publicly traded equity. And third, the purpose of
the arrangement, and its contractual parameters, are irrelevant from beginning to
end. The revised regulations made technical changes in some areas, such as
reducing the threshold to $5,000, but the first and third points remain apt.
Finally, there were actually two different versions of the "Significant
Financial Interest" standard to promote objectivity. While the investigator was
obligated to disclose personal financial interests that "would reasonably appear to
be affected" by the research," the official must tag those "interests that directly
and significantly affect the . . . research."7 4 One asks whether the interests could
be affected; the other asks whether the research could be, and then the difference
is spiced up with words like "reasonably," "appear," "significantly," and
"directly." The difference between the two standards created worlds of
complexity and uncertainty, singly and in their joint (or perhaps separate)
168
72 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2011).
73 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(c)(1)(i) (2011).
74 42 C.F.R. § 605(a) (2011).
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application. For example, it was unclear which standard required a judgment
personal to the investigator and whether "significance" should be judged with
reference to the investigator as subject, the official as subject, or from the
viewpoint of the "reasonable man." No guidance clarified whether a judgment
was to be made abstractly or in light of circumstances, such as the share-price
history of a particular company or the relative wealth and wealth-seeking
propensities of the investigator.
The regulations left unclear what weight should be given to a mistake of fact
that produces a subjective, but ill-founded, COL For example, an investigator
might mistakenly think her research will have no impact and thus feel no
incentive to distort her findings-or mistakenly think her work is of pivotal value
to the company and thus subjectively feel a temptation to distort the results of her
research. It was also unclear how certain the required probability judgments
should be. These questions remain under the recent revisions. While the
investigator's standard for disclosure has broadened to a simpler one about the
relationship between an interest and institutional roles, the institution's standard
remains inherently probabilistic, with no guidance about whether judgments
should be based on generalities or specifics, with what degree of probability, and
with what evidence to justify the assessment.
B. FDA Regulations
Since February 1998, the FDA has required anyone who submits a
marketing application for a drug, biological, or other medical device to include a
statement describing certain "disclosable financial arrangements" of any
investigator involved in a clinical trial whose resulting data is submitted in
support of a determination of efficacy. The agency has also required disclosure of
any trial in which a single investigator makes a significant contribution to a
determination of safety.75 The applicant must have gathered that information
before such a trial starts, and periodically thereafter until one year after a trial is
complete. "Disclosable financial arrangements" 76 means "compensation made to
the investigator in which the value of compensation could be affected by study
outcome" or "a proprietary interest in the tested product" (whether the interest is
direct or indirect, including, unlike the NIH standard, through a university
license). It includes any equity interest in a publicly held company that exceeds
$50,000 in value or in the sponsor of a covered study regardless of value (with all
forms of equity lumped together as the NIH regulation does).
While the FDA definitions are crisp and clear, this approach nonetheless has
a number of defects. First, it not only fails to address COI issues for all of basic
science research, it excludes many clinical trials, including, for example, phase I
169
75 See 21 C.F.R. § 54.2 (2011).
76 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3) (2012).
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pharmacokinetic trials and any trial for which the sponsor chooses not to submit
data. Indeed, it shares with the NIH approach a delegation of all responsibility to
a highly interested judge (in this case, the industry sponsor). Unlike the NIH
system, the sponsor must report in more detail both the nature of the COI and the
measures taken to mitigate any negative effect on data. But like the NIH system,
reported data will not reveal to the FDA whether the sponsor has failed to
disclose completely these COIs, and the system conclusively presumes the
sponsor, will act without bias. There are neither data nor guidance concerning
what management strategies work or which of these situations is really
problematic. The remedies of the FDA are also limited: monitoring, requesting
further data analysis, soliciting additional studies, or declining to accept study
data. The latter penalties certainly are financially consequential to a sponsor. The
problem is that it is unknown whether they incent diligence or deceit. Indeed, this
regulation, promulgated well before the COI incidents and evidence discussed
above, was evidently insufficient to prevent them, and has continued unchanged
to this day.
C. AAMC Self-Regulatory Efforts
Finally, I turn to the sequence of AAMC reports discussing COIs. The first
of these reports suggested institutional procedures to address investigator COIs in
clinical research through newly described COI committees. Rather than
implementing the old regulatory standards, it replaced them with a rebuttable
presumption against certain interests. The second AAMC report addressed
institutional COIs through separation of intellectual property functions from
administrative functions, management of the COIs of senior executives, and
newly minted institutional COI committees. Finally, in the wake of a report
suggesting that institutions had taken little action to create and implement COI
policies, the AAMC attempted to address institutions' evident uncertainty in how
to apply the presumption with illustrative hypothetical examples. Throughout, the
AAMC artfully attempted to couple preserving institutional local control under
limited regulations, with an urgent message that institutions should voluntarily
adopt uniform model policies. What made the policies "model policies" was less
their empirical basis-the AAMC too was forced to act in the absence of data-
than the blue ribbon membership and collective prestige of the commissions
creating them, and the emphasis on maintaining public trust through stringent
academic self-regulation. However, while procedures could point to competing
values, they could not answer the very question they posed: Which arrangements
are optimal?
D. Meaningful Law and Due Process Values
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understanding of these termsn meaning a decisional principle for case-specific
judgments that are not outcome determined by a specific, less contingent rule. It
shifts, from the issuers to those who interpret it and those who are subject to it,
the obligation to give a concrete practical answer to the central question whether
a particular form of collaboration, interest, or relationship would likely bias
research. For interpreters of this standard to apply it meaningfully and
consistently, they need sufficient facts to reach rational conclusions in applying
its terms.78 They must understand the forms of collaboration and their effects,
together with cultural factors affecting bias and contribution to innovation.
Unfortunately, these interpreters do not have such pivotal facts at their disposal.
The standard also fails to give them access to general or specific experience of
others, and it does not include innovation-oriented values among factors to be
weighed or reconciled. Interpreters are broadly empowered to dispose of assets
and restrict personal freedom, but there is no appeal within or required by the
regulations.7 9 And information about the wisdom of the choices that interpreters
have made is inaccessible even to the interpreters themselves. No prescribed
processes yield facts certain to be material, let alone reasoned conclusions to be
tested or incorporated in a body of experience.
Imagine the following hypothetical, illustrating the excessive flexibility of
the regulations before the October 2011 amendments: Dr. Researcher owns
10,000 shares of Merck common stock and is also doing NIH-funded research on
next-generation Merck orphan drugs. The chairperson of the COI committee,
distinguishing small companies from global giants, believes, with some factual
basis, that the share price of large companies is affected by so many factors that
outcomes of one small-market drug trial will not materially affect it. On this
basis, the chairperson determines that the research could not affect the company's
value and thus that the value of Dr. Researcher's Merck stock could not be
affected by her research. Basing his view on that perspective, the chairperson
finds that Dr. Researcher's stock holdings do not create a COI requiring
management. Dr. Researcher, however, believes that her ground-breaking work
77 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
78 See supra notes 25, 29 and accompanying text.
79 Of course, organizations have hierarchies and chief executive officers to whom one might
or might not have recourse. Universities, academic hospitals, and research institutions may have
academic or other procedures governing misconduct, and, perhaps informal processes that they may
or may not choose to apply, without further guidance, to COI matters. Typically, these do not
involve the array of due process rights-such as right to counsel, discovery, and cross-
examination-required before permanent deprivation of property, because they are designed
around withdrawal of what are generally academic privileges. Proceedings for research misconduct
do require a record (though not counsel, discovery, or cross-examination), but they are limited to
cases of fraud, plagiarism, and fabrication. The federal COI regulations, however, do not require
such procedures. See 42 C.F.R. § 83 (2005). For ORI Policies and Regulations, see DEP'T OF
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could affect stock price and has enough shares to find the potential profit
interesting. Consciously or unconsciously, she distorts her results favorably to
Merck. Yet, as far as the NIH COI regulations are concerned, both Dr.
Researcher and the chairperson have complied with the regulations. Under the
revised regulations, Dr. Researcher would have to disclose her interest as related
to her institutional role. However, the same dichotomous results could occur: the
chairperson determines that there is no COI, but the researcher, acting under
different beliefs about how trial results affect share price, distorts her results.
With such an open standard, no uniform processes, and no data to
appropriately shape discretion, there is no reason to believe that the many NIH-
funded academic institutions will reach sound, consistent judgments. Instead, it is
a reasonable hypothesis that they are reaching a diversely motivated set of
judgments without any data concerning their actual necessity or effect.
That hypothesis has been tested, and it is true. A survey in 2000 of the ten
top NIH-funded medical schools showed that "current conflict-of-interest
policies at medical schools vary widely and have substantial shortcomings in the
context of clinical trials."80 Only one medical school approached an ideal of
comprehensiveness and avoided arbitrary exceptions. A contemporaneous survey
of 304 major research institutions, including 127 medical schools, also found that
"there was considerable variation among policies in all domains," "important
terms were not adequately defined," and that "the only nearly universal feature
was that management of conflicts and the penalties for nondisclosure were totally
discretionary."" Mandated disclosure to research participants, journals, funders,
and colleagues was typically absent. On this basis the authors of this survey made
several recommendations: that federal agencies should adopt a common and
consistent rule; that institutions should report details of COIs and their
management to funders; and that there ought to be complete disclosure to all
journals, readers, and review committees such as IRBs. More than a decade has
passed since the authors made these recommendations, but they have not yet
been incorporated in laws or regulations, except as noted above.
In 2002, an NIH survey of grantee institutions found continuing variation
with extraordinary lapses. The survey reported interesting statistics: 86% did not
define "research," 52% did not reference the appropriate regulation, 74% did not
commit to making COI information available to the NIH, 45% did not require a
conflict to be reported to the NIH, and 68% did not require corrective action to be
reported in the event a conflicted investigator had biased the research. 8 2 A 2007
80 Bernard Lo et al., Conflict-of-Interest Policies for Investigators in Clinical Trials, 343 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1616 (2000).
81 Stephen Van McCrary et al., A National Survey of Policies on Disclosure of Conflicts of
Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1621 (2000).
82 See NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, TARGETED SITE REVIEWS ON FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
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Targeted Site Review of funded biomedical research institutions found
continuing compliance problems, including defining "investigators" too
narrowly, untimely and inadequate reporting, having inconsistent reporting
processes, submitting grants before collecting required COI information,
expending funds before or without notifying the NIH of COI resolution, and
failing to monitor sub-recipients. These are all critical problems.
In 2008, the AAMC published another guide for COI procedures, in the hope
of accelerating progress.83 That report did include model policies and some
scenarios to guide consideration of cases. But it could not do what the federal
government had not done: assemble or fund the assembly of the data necessary to
determine whether a disclosed interest might actually affect research. This
critical finding, required by the regulations, is impossible to make except through
sheer guesswork or through generalizing one's own biases in whatever context-
whether anti-industry or pro-industry. There is no record except a disclosure, no
factual basis for inferring its consequences as to the subject investigator, and both
permissive exoneration and prohibitive disposition of the investigator's assets or
grant are equally arbitrary. With the key determinants of a judgment-the
projections, experience, and intuitions of diverse members who require no
qualifications-outside that limited record, what would or could an appeal even
look like, and how could the process be subject to epistemic correction?
The FDA standards are more specific with respect to certain disclosures, but
they too fall short. The regulations do not identify the standard by which the
significance of disclosed arrangements shall be assessed. The FDA has made
itself a black box, depriving investigators and industry of a means of ensuring
that they have complied with applicable regulations.
As Professor Sunstein illuminates, there are good reasons that lawmakers
sometimes prefer standards to rules, such as where facts sufficient to establish a
specific rule are unavailable to issuers, but interpreters will have access to
operative facts through the cases they adjudicate or otherwise.84 Pertinent here,
and in defense of the regulatory approach described above, it can sometimes be
important that local culture influences both interpretive processes, and, to a
degree, specific outcomes. Here, there is no question that a university or research
institution's culture of oversight, the views of its scientific community on
potentially private arrangements, the intellectual and financial resources these
institutions have to devote to such efforts, as well the prevalence and variety of
83 AAMC-AAU Advisory Committee on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subject
Research, Protecting Patients, Preserving Integrity, Advancing Health: Accelerating the
Implementation of COI Policies in Human Subject Research (2008), available at
https://services.aamc.org/Publications/index.cfm.
84 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 149-51 (engaging in a pointed discussion of practical
reasons to adopt a standard or case-based approach instead of a rule. The whole volume addresses
the issue of rules, standards, and cases, as modes of lawmaking in a broader context, including their
tolerance for political compromise as incompletely theorized agreements).
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industry relationships, all might make a practical and cultural difference to how
COIs are tolerated, ignored, or encouraged. Thus, a rule affecting diverse
institutions might be under- or overinclusive and may be perceived as unfair,
particularly if data are not used to formulate a sound rule. There might be
multiple and diverse criteria affecting an outcome, and how to weigh such
criteria might be uncertain a priori, as might the weight given to unpredictable
nuances of specific cases. In addition, to the extent that fact-finding is more
complete through the case-based observations and actions of many, rather than
through the legislated policy generalizations of a few, it may be that the
epistenic competence of the COI regulatory system as a whole would be
maximized via committees acting rationally under a standard from a basic and
evolving core of facts concerning collaboration variation, risks, and outcomes.
But even worse than an unsound rule, which has at least consistency to
recommend it, is floating a vague standard in a factual vacuum of only partial
policy-scope to adjudicators without known epistemic competence. Even worse
is to place institutional committees in a system that wholly lacks any method to
gather and compare foundational factual assertions, contest its factual
conclusions, and learn from its mistakes.
Practically, such a system will produce contested, inconsistent results over a
prolonged period amidst mounting questions about its credibility, regardless of
the best efforts or good faith of the adjudicators. Conceptually, the flaws of such
a system are so fundamental that it is questionable whether it is even law under
generally accepted standards of jurisprudence. The flaws of this regulatory
system go beyond being "bad law" or "unconstitutional law," both of which
might be given effect until struck down or legislatively altered. It means this
85 Cf ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009) (analyzing relative
epistemic competence of judicial and legislative methods based on numerosity, diversity,
timeliness, and potential for information aggregation, among other factors). Vermeule does not
apply his analysis to a system where diverse adjudicatory committees, acting in effect like the arms
of an administrative agency, operate under a standard. However, for purposes of his analysis, he
groups the executive and the legislature together and distinguishes them from courts applying
common law methods, leaving for the future how such an analysis might be applied to the
regulatory agents of an executive agency. Id. This Article does not purport to lay out such an
analysis. Among other things, that would make the practical question of how to address COls in the
innovation ecology depend on a branch-versus-branch debate among constitutional scholars,
involving many distinct factors, that has no foreseeable definitive conclusion. However, the
questions Vermeule asks of constitutional law ought to be asked of any law that purports to provide
sound answers to important questions where facts are uncertain and proper policy is contested.
Thus this article was conceived from asking about COls within the innovation ecology these
questions, to which existing law had no good answer: How will general and case-specific facts be
ascertained and confirmed? How will general factual premises remain timely or evolve with system
change? How will information aggregate and what are the epistemically relevant qualities of those
who will gather and aggregate it? How will biases be avoided or corrected through the process
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regulation was never a successful act of lawmaking in the first place. A review of
those jurisprudential standards, their defense, and the debate about their relative
merits is outside the scope of this paper, but the standards are sufficiently well
known that the discussion is warranted. To sidestep the debate about which is
most "right," I will investigate several that are leading candidates for defining
"law."
The most basic initial test, originating with H.L.A. Hart, is whether there is a
"rule of recognition" that distinguishes what is a valid legal obligation,
concerning how to structure academic-industry arrangements, from what is not. 87
Ordinarily, promulgation through required administrative procedures would serve
this purpose, but not here because each regulation involves an intermediary with
incomplete legal authority. Thus, the NIH regulation provides a mandate for
institutions to create a system affecting investigators. But from an investigator's
perspective it is unclear whether the institution will have done so in a valid
manner. Compliance reports suggest that such institutions do not. In any event,
since the regulations do not apply to investigators directly, whether the
investigator has any legal obligations is an open question. Similarly, the FDA
regulation imposes a rule on investigators to file certain disclosures with the
sponsor and an obligation on sponsors to collect and file these disclosures, while
imposing no obligation on institutions. The sponsor has no clear direction from
the FDA about which arrangements to permit versus which to prohibit or
manage. The sponsor has no authority to direct the investigator to do anything to
alter arrangements, and neither does the FDA under its own regulations. For COI
management and institutions more generally, there is no clear rule. To mandate
that a researcher must disclose X-without knowing whether the state will or will
not respond to this disclosure, and, if it were to take any action, would not reveal
the criteria guiding that decision to act-is to create a rule that cannot be
recognized as a law in the sense of "thou shall not X."
Other less basic standards of jurisprudence would require more. They go
beyond Hart's "rule of recognition" test and demand realistic conformance to
certain legal ideals to make a mandate "law." Thus, they also look to whether
there are either definitive rules, or less definitive standards coupled with the data
and goal clarity sufficient to guide case law development; adequate, prospective
notice of which conduct is permitted and which is proscribed; rational
86 This analysis is not intended as a commentary on the constitutionality of the federal COI
regulations or the constitutionality of any directives issued by universities or hospitals under their
authority (such as a directive to investigators to divest personal assets even at a loss in order to
participate in research necessary to provide them with required salary support). Apart from the
interesting question of whether there is state action by those committees or officials not part of
government institutions, an accurate answer would necessarily address the substantive and
procedural effects, if any, of institutions' supplementary academic procedures and policies' unique
wording.
87 HART, supra note 8, at I 10-16.
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promulgation of rules and standards, based on confirmable facts, case outcomes
rationally explained by disinterested adjudicators applying a sufficiently clear
standard to material facts adequately determined, and consistent predictable
outcomes.
The COI regulations do not satisfy even one of these criteria. Of course,
some of these are alternative considerations. Law need not simply be rules, and it
need not be just cases. But it must at least provide for the sound creation and
interpretation of one or the combination, based on factual predicates that not only
ground its rationality at inception, but also ground its interpretation. Indeed, if the
goal is public trust and legitimacy, and compliance by the regulated, then
presumably the presence of the elements above must be visible both to regulated
parties and to unregulated public observers. Not so here. In creating both
standards without procedures, and omitting data that could ground or inform
sound discretion, our existing regulatory systems are not law that manages COI
problems-even apart from due process questions, and even apart from the
competing framework of the innovation ecology in which scientists practically
reside.
Interestingly, this critique of the existing regulations, like the due process
observations, is wholly new. Although the regulations have been criticized, it is
not on these grounds, but on grounds wholly captured by the virtue and non-
virtue polarity. Before I set about discussing how better systems may be built, I
will rapidly survey the minimal literature on COIs, both to demonstrate its limits
and to see if it that literature can nonetheless help.
III. LITERATURE: VIRTUOUS ANSWERS TO HALF OF THE PROBLEM
If the real-world problem is to consider COIs and innovation together, the
literature provides little direct assistance. Starting with the business literature,
there are those who exhort corporations to be good citizens, obey the law, and
avoid fraud, whether in general terms or through specified programs in corporate
compliance with select mandates. There is also a separate literature on
innovation. That innovators' individual integrity or subconscious biases might be
affected by incentive structures, and require mitigation through means other than
corporate value statements and employee discipline for wrongdoing, does not
enter into the business literature's discussion of innovation.
But the business literature does speak, empirically, to a conception of
innovation and its requirements that prove instructive for narrowing consulting
agreements to where scientists' unique contributions might actually lie and in
what context. The business literature is most focused on promoting innovation
88 See sources cited supra note 8 and accompanying text. Lon Fuller has suggested additional,
more stringent threshold criteria and harsher judgment. See Fuller, supra note 8. Fuller's other
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among corporate employees. Therefore, it naturally addresses how teams,
organizational silos, and other commonplaces of the American corporate
environment affect innovation. For example, it speaks to allowing innovators to
be influential across organizational silos by focusing their contributions on their
particular gifts, so that their credibility in different contexts is maintained, and
what is particularly valuable in their approaches can be more widely
disseminated. Reflecting a backdrop of American business bureaucracy, business
literature discusses how one might systemize out-of-the-box thinking and foster
teams with complementary expertise that will learn quickly, rather than
demanding overbroad contributions from each individual. It recommends
incentivizing scientists based on their discoveries rather than the degree to which
nonscientific arms of corporations successfully exploit those discoveries. The
literature further recommends using individual talent, within its bounds, for
corporate goals without harming initiative by freezing it within a bureaucratic
matrix more suitable for routine, high-volume tasks.89
In contrast, current academic consulting agreements with industry frequently
define services broadly, with scientists ostensibly being invited to give advice
and perhaps advocate, with potential investors or regulators, for very generally
described topics superficially resembling scientists' specific expertise, but
including matters outside their typical experience (e.g., such as marketing or
patent strategies to avoid competition). Compensation is often contingent, linking
payments or options to corporate revenue or new stock issuances supported by
development or sales of a new drug or device. Such broad contingencies are
outside a scientist's knowledge or control, but generally suggest that the fate of
the scientist and the company are intertwined. Each person's financial interest
becomes that financial milestone, each person's job, if it is to be compensated,
becomes doing what he can to support the same key financial goal. The goal is
not just paramount: it is essential.
In fact, the major activity within such relationships may be entirely outside
the scope or methods of underlying scientific insights, innovation, or intuition.
The latter might well be confined to likely compounds to test and their likely
behavior, the needs and vulnerabilities of various research participants given
specific diseases or conditions, potential research methods or tools, or other ways
scientists contribute unique expertise in interpreting and overcoming scientific
roadblocks from knowledge of their field. This dichotomy between the goal of
compensating scientists for their actual expertise and the structure of consulting
89 See, e.g., Tim Brown, Design Thinking, HARV. Bus. REv., June 2008, at 85; Jeffrey Cohn,
et al., Finding and Grooming Breakthrough Innovators, HARV. Bus. REV., Dec. 2008, at 64;
Thomas H. Davenport et al., Who's Bringing You Hot Ideas and How Are You Responding?, HARV.
Bus. REv., Feb. 2003, at 59; Peter F. Drucker, The Discipline of Innovation, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Aug. 2002, at 95; Amy Edmondson et al., Speeding Up Team Learning, HARV. Bus. REV., Oct.
2001, at 125; Jean-Pierre Gamier, Rebuilding the R&D Engine in Big Pharma, HARV. Bus. REV.,
May 2008, at 69.
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arrangements should lead us to question whether broad-brush consulting
arrangements are as critical to health care innovation as some opponents of COI
regulation claim. 90 Nonetheless, scientists can make a core of innovative
contributions through engagement with industry, and the fairness of
compensating them for those contributions is undeniable. Narrowing consulting
services and payment arrangements to that core would help alleviate some COIs.
Probably because of a lack of familiarity with the subject matter, legal
academic scholarship has proposed no integrative solution either. Indeed, the
legal academic literature on COIs, measured by volume, is surprisingly small.9 '
90 See, in particular, Stossel, supra note 29.
91 Although the following, nearly exhaustive, list may seem sizable, for a topic of this import,
this is actually a small quantity of legal academic literature. See Mark Barnes & Patrik S. Florencio,
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: The Problem of Institutional Conflicts,
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390 (2002); Cohen, supra note 59; Janet L. Dolgin & Joel Weintraub,
Biomedical Research and the Law-Selected Issues: The Pharmaceutical Industry and Its
Relationship with Government, Academic, Physicians and Consumers, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681
(2006); Janet L. Dolgin, Debating Conflicts: Medicine, Commerce, and Contrasting Ethical
Orders, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 705 (2006); Gordon DuVal, Institutional Conflicts of Interest:
Protecting Human Subjects, Scientific Integrity, and Institutional Accountability, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 613 (2004); Robert Gatter, Conflicts of Interest in International Human Drug Research and
the Insifficiency of International Protections, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 351 (2006); Jesse A. Goldner,
Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution
to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379 (2000); Jesse A. Goldner, Regulating
Conflicts of Interest in Research: The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1211
(2009); Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest in Medical Research:
Overview and Analysis of Institutional Controls, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 251 (2003); Marshall B.
Kapp, Drug Companies, Dollars, and the Shaping ofAmerican Medical Practice, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J.
237 (2005); Sheldon Krimsky, Combating the Funding Effect in Science: What's Beyond
Transparency?, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 81 (2010) [hereinafter Combating the Funding Effect in
Science]; Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science and its Implications for the Judiciary,
13 J.L. & POL'Y 43 (2005); Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and its Normative
Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1999); Cinead R. Kubiak, Conflicting Interests &
Conflicting Laws: Re-aligning the Purpose and Practice of Research Ethics Committees, 30
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 759 (2005); Patricia C. Kuszler, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Legal
and Ethical Issues: Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible Dreams and
Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SymP. J. 115 (2001); Susan M. Kuzma, Criminal Liability for
Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 357 (1992); Karen A. Jordan,
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: Proposals for a More Effective
Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15 (2003); Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey,
Confronting Conflict: Addressing Institutional Conflicts of Interest in Academic Medical Centers,
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 136 (2010); Michael J. Malinowski, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research:
Legal and Ethical Issues: Institutional Conflicts and Responsibilities in an Age of Academic-
Industry Alliances, 8 WIDENER L. SymP. J. 47 (2001); Michael J. Malinowski, Foreword:
Academic-Industry Collaborations in the Clinic, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. ii (2001); Frances H.
Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REv. 423 (2001);
Pilar N. Ossorio, Pills, Bills and Shills: Physician-Researcher's Conflicts of Interest, 8 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 75 (2001); Erica Rose, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Legal and Ethical
Issues: Financial Conflicts of Interest: How are We Managing?, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (2001);
Robert M. Sade, Dangerous Liaisons? Industry Relations with Health Professionals, 37 J.L. MED.
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Nearly all of the existing literature expresses outrage at some of the COI cases
discussed in Part I, or others. This outrage is not misplaced, but it is partial,
leading almost all authors to focus on COIs as a character problem not requiring
situational, factual analysis, and separated from the industry collaboration and
robust innovation ecology that legal colleagues in other disciplines
simultaneously urge. It is as if COIs belong to criminal law, where bad acts lead
inevitably to a search for the bad actor.
Finally, if COIs are an ethical problem, then one ought to look for solutions
within biomedical ethics. But classic bioethics has had almost nothing to say
about COIs, despite its general confidence that medical and scientific ethical
problems can be addressed by considering beneficence, respect for persons,
justice, and respect for community values. If ethical principles are invoked here,
they are different ones: stewardship, transparency, and disinterestedness. 92 A
more balanced ethical approach would consider the virtues of industry
collaboration, including both the altruistic and intellectual virtues associated with
innovation. It would give due consideration to a practical orientation toward
results, political collegiality, strategic thinking, credible candor,
multidimensional thinking, conciliation, and devotion. 9 3 These are the same
collaborative and activist virtues that bioethicists credit political activism as
potentially involving when bioethicists act beyond the Ivory Tower: One could
add many other virtues, including courage, ability to articulate and act in
accordance with principles when other group members disagree, and public
mindedness. Yet bioethics has offered no such full account of industry
collaborations involved in COIs or of the range of human responses-good and
bad-to industry collaboration and its incentives. The virtuous avoid COIs, the
pragmatic manage them without data or adequate regulatory basis, and the
conceptual space between COIs and innovation ecology is vacant, involving
separate perspectives that never meet except in the dueling expectations visited
on scientists themselves.
Gap Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497 (2008);
William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning "Conflicts of Interest" Won't
Solve Incentive Problems In Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1413 (2007); Richard R. Sharp
& Mark Yarborough, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Informed Trust and the Financing of
Biomedical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 460 (2006); Sheila R. Shulman & Andrea Kuettel,
Drug Development and the Public Health Mission: Collaborative Challenges at the FDA, NIH, and
Academic Medical Centers, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 663 (2005); Kevin W. Williams, Managing Physician
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private Setting, 59 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 45 (2004); Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the
Erosion of Research Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 893 (2003); Joseph B.
Clamon, Note, The Search for a Cure: Combating the Problem of Conflicts of Interest that
Currently Plagues Biomedical Research, 89 IOWA L. REv. 235 (2003).
92 See, e.g., Krimsky, Combating the Funding Effect in Science, supra note 90, at 84-92.
93 Martin Gunderson, The Virtues of Scholarship and the Virtues of Political Action, 19
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 171 (2009).
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Concerning the COI regulations themselves, there are principally three
critiques of the regulations from the legal literature: the virtue-prohibitionist
critique, the counter-fiduciary critique, and the circumstance-based, "probabilist"
critique.
A. The Virtue-Prohibitionist Critique
This critique, the primary response by leaders of organized medicine and
most legal scholars who have written on biomedical COIs to COI cases, is that
COIs are self-interested choices by scientists that reflect their weakening
commitment to the traditional virtues of physicians and scientists, including
independence, objectivity, and a single-minded fiduciary responsibility to
patients.94 The consequences of COIs are, in their view, unmanageable, because
of the primary harm, which is the corruption of academic independence;
objectivity is accomplished by the act of compensated collaboration. Moreover,
secondary harms, like harm to participants, are certain to follow once those
virtues are compromised. Their arguments are grounded in accounts of values
and virtues and would prohibit all compensated collaboration. They claim that
public trust requires a complete bar on academic-industry partnerships, because
the public could not trust a scientist, physician, or research enterprise known to
lack virtue.
There are three problems with this view. First, its account of virtue is
historically false. Reimbursement, not just patient welfare, always has mattered
with regard to defining such virtues, 95 as does engaging patients in research
despite researchers' conflicting interest in gaining knowledge. 96 Second, it
ignores the potential variety of collaborations and the evolving role of scientists
and physicians in applying knowledge. Third, it ignores the socially sanctioned
competing values of innovation and the innovation ecology.
There are three principal variations on the virtue-prohibitionist approach.
94 See, e.g., Kassirer & Angell, supra note 27 (analyzing the effects of financial conflicts of
interest on biomedical research and critiquing the policies used to handle disclosure of such
conflicts); see also Brennan, supra note 27; DeAngelis, supra note 27 (introducing articles
addressing the prevalence of conflicts of interest between physicians and companies that financially
support teaching and research, along with the effects of this relationship on public trust of
physicians); Liang & Mackey, supra note 90; cf Greg Koski, Research, Regulations, and
Responsibility: Confronting the Compliance Myth-A Reaction to Professor Gatter, 52 EMORY L.J.
403, 408-09 (2003) (arguing that COI regulations are flawed for emphasizing administrative
approaches and a culture of compliance rather than promoting a culture of conscience, because
good values, not regulations, will provide an answer to COls and research ethics).
95 See, e.g., STARR, supra note 26, at 25-26 (illustrating the connection among professional
autonomy, professional ethics, and control of competition and pricing); id. at 385-86 (discussing
features of physician practice and pricing designed to increase health care costs and increase profit,
including reducing the scope of surgeons' actual service to patients while maintaining full
reimbursement).
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The first variation is that responsibility for COI assessment and elimination
should be transferred away from universities and hospitals, because their
conflicting interests are unavoidable and surpassingly influential. Such
assessment is factually outside the scope of the professional expertise and
disinterested virtue required to justify the privilege of self-regulation. 9 7 Ensuring
the credibility, knowledge, and disinterest of data-educated interpreters is
essential, of course. It is the data-independent, binary good/bad approach and
innovation-apart resolution that place this within the virtue-prohibitionist camp.
The second variation is treating human subject regulations and institutional
assurances of compliance as creating legal rights and obligations to be enforced
civilly by participants or through criminal penalties. 98 The apparent analogy is to
antidiscrimination laws or the criminal law, except there are no defenses or
affirmative defenses that might reflect some social weighing of competing
concerns. (Consider the "No, I was innovating!" defense, for example.) This
approach increases the size of the penalty and arguably has justice to commend
it. However, it does nothing to address the fundamental question of what to hit,
where, how hard, and whether perspicacious use of incentives would improve
public policy.
The third version of the virtue approach starts from the same premises, but
argues that if virtuous transparency is adopted through disclosure, COIs are
adequately addressed. 99 Empirical surveys of research participants and studies of
global cultural variation rebut this theoretical claim. Disclosure may produce
confusion, and bargaining asymmetries or other factors may lead to embracing or
acquiescing in problematic relationships.' 00
B. The Counter-Fiduciaty Critique
The Counter-Fiduciary critique, best articulated by William Sage, argues
that a fiduciary conceptualization of COIs rests on mistake. Since fiduciaries are
essentially agents, and researchers are not agents of participants, relational duties
and language should be replaced by socially imposed duties reflecting a
utilitarian calculus that accepts some participant harm as the cost of an
appropriately balanced emphasis on promoting academic-industry
collaboration.o'0 In Sage's view, COI discussion based on professional fidelity to
97 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 90.
98 See, e.g., Clamon, supra note 90.
99 See, e.g., Kuzma, supra note 43; Sharp & Yarborough, supra note 90.
100 See Timothy Caulfield, Globalization, Conflicts of Interest and Clinical Research: An
Overview of Trends and Issues, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 31 (2001); Kuszler, supra note 39; see also
Christine Grady et al., The Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know about
Investigator Financial Interests, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592 (2006); Mark G. Kuczewski, Conflict
of Interests in Biomedical Research: Beyond Disclosure, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 103 (2010).
101 See Sage, supra note 27.
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patients isses the reality of the researcher-participant relationship. Sage's
position is the most powerful independent critique of the Virtue-Prohibitionist
approach. Its difficulty is that, from the perspective of an opposing combatant, it
is only as strong as the premise that fiduciary obligations are no more than
agency obligations with a fancy name, which is contested both historically and
jurisprudentially. In addition, absent data, it may well be premature to assume
that supporting innovation will come only at the expense of increased and
unmanaged bias in related research.
Far less sophisticated versions of the Counter-Fiduciary critique (typically
advanced by researchers with consulting agreements) abound in the biomedical
literature. However, they simply repeat in different forms the beneficence of
collaboration in generalized terms, without grappling with competing views,
articulating the basis for modified discussion, or formalizing an ethical defense.
C. The Circumstance-Based, "Probabilist" Critique
The Circumstance-Based, "Probabilist" critique is a response to, and
analysis of, demands that the regulations be interpreted to take into account
individual researchers' propensities and scientific reputations in COI
management. The leading example, the IOM 2009 report, defines a COI as "a set
of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgments or actions
regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest ...
. A COI describes a situation, and is not per se a judgment about the character or
actions of an individual."1 0 2 A variation on this approach, deemphasizing a
psychological focus on the researcher, looks to the probable effect on others.
COIs are not wrong, only their bad effects are problematic where they occur.'o0
The probabilist critique claims to avoid individual character determinations by
turning to circumstances. It seems to promise objectivity, but it actually does not.
The passive voice may conceal it, but one is still left with "risk for whom, me or
you or some unknown reasonable man" and "as assessed by whom" and under
what standards? Indeed, since the circumstantial categories may end up reflecting
on character, the escape from personal character judgments is more apparent than
real, unless the categories are gross enough that they only vaguely reflect
differential risks. In addition, like virtue criticisms, it looks only at one side of
the New Scientist equation, offering no assessment or model for integrating,
adapting or optimizing the parameters for collaboration and innovation.
Since coherence with the innovation ecology is not a goal of the COI
literature, and debating competing principles rather than investigating convergent
facts is its main method, that literature provides neither data nor insight into how
to foster both research integrity and innovative translation of discoveries through
102 See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 46.
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precise adjustments in academic-industry relationships.
Understanding COIs requires richer knowledge of the context of
collaborations and contract terms that guide those agreements. First, regardless of
enforceability, these terms may represent understandings that have a
psychological or behavioral impact. Second, they may be the basis of study,
looking towards a fuller understanding of their influence in COI creation and
mitigation and their utility or necessity in understanding optimal researcher
participation with industry. In this light, the claim that consulting agreements of
unspecified services are necessary for drug innovation is clearly overbroad.
Conversely, implicit claims in "sunshine-oriented" databases - indicating only
dollar amounts paid to researchers by private funders, not the payment purpose or
terms of use - are insufficient, misleading and unjust to both researchers and
industry. Consulting should neither be demonized nor canonized, but understood
and represented in context. Third, if their links to behaviors and their social
context are both understood, contract terms may be tools-other than divestment
or limitations on research participation-for defining permissible and
impermissible situations, particularly if they are considered within understanding
the parties' overall relationships. Indeed, if a scientist's services are narrowed to
providing advice on matters where their advice could support innovation
development, with contractual terms eliminating distorting incentive structures
and protecting academic values, then institutions will have a mechanism to
connect COI analysis to the innovation ecology.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The critiques of existing COI regulations are a fundamental starting point for
reform. There is no reason to believe that a completely deregulated system will
address these critiques, in part because of COIs' potentially covert nature, and in
part because of their extraordinary variability and the extraordinary variability in
sophistication and insight among actors. Indeed, the federal government
experimented with deregulation before 1995, when pressures to collaborate were
fewer, and it did not work. Lack of regulation created the circumstances leading
to the current regulations.
Thus, despite their fundamental invalidity as a matter of jurisprudence, and
their wide-ranging departure from the established norms of administrative law,
current regulations should be improved, not simply abolished. The process to do
so should include (1) rectifying procedural defects, using lawyerly values and
procedural devices for increasing accountability, case-specific accuracy and
systematic epistemic competence; (2) empirical investigation, sufficient for
regulation of COIs within the innovation ecology, and informed choices about
forms of collaboration that create both significant benefit and significant risk; (3)
interim use of default rules that create useful incentives until optimal ones can be
created; and (4) creating "how-to" models for collaboration among institutions,
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researchers, and industry, so that the efficiency, justice, consistency and rational
basis of prospective, published, testable, factually-grounded regulatory guidance
would replace unpredictable retrospective adjudications. I will take up each of
these topics in turn below.
A. Fix the COI Regulations Procedurally
The procedural infirmities identified in Part III should be rectified, in order
to respect due process values and to improve the epistemic competence of the
system, through qualified interpreters ascertaining facts according to empirically
defensible inferences concerning both behavioral responses to incentives and
effective management strategies. There are three additional steps the NIH could
take:
1. Ensure that regulatory interpreters, functioning as "judges" with
extraordinary power, are qualified. Ensure also that COI committees
themselves are sufficiently diverse, and organizationally situated, to be
recognized as legitimate, knowledgeable, and independent. The regulations
permit COI decisions to be made by individuals as diverse as a mid-level
research administrator, the university provost personally, or a research
hospital's general counsel. It is obvious that each is likely to approach this
open-ended inquiry with different dispositions, understanding, and authority.
Specifically, committees should include the following personnel: senior
scientists experienced in working with industry and with demonstrated ability
to remain independent; legal counsel not involved in industry transactions
being evaluated; community membership not limited to business
representatives; the IRB chair; the chief academic officer or other officer in a
position to regularly compare research endeavors and publications with
collaborations; and, as staff to answer questions, but not participate in
deliberation, advocacy, or decision making, a senior research administrator;
and the head of the office responsible for technology transfer and industry
relationships. In a training institution, the committee should include students
and fellows.
2. Protect the COI process from institutional COIs. Regulations prohibit an IRB
determination that research is unethical from being overturned by
administrative decisions from above.'0 Should the same be true for a COI
committee, to be committed to its independence? If some institutions are
reluctant to accept this, it may be because, internally, arbitrary and
unpredictable results may flow from the lack of any regulatory guidance on
committee member qualifications, procedures, inferences, management
184
104 45 C.F.R. § 46.112 (2011).
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strategies, and data. The wise course would be to design a system sufficiently
inclusive and rational in its thinking that it both deserves and receives that
special, independent authority. The committee and its authority should be
sanctioned by a directive of the Board of Directors, and the committee should
report to that Board directly, in executive session. The board directive should
clarify that the committee will consider requests for reconsideration, but that
there is no appeal from its adverse decisions except based on error; and then
the appeal is to a committee of the board.
3. Assuring the legitimacy of COI management may require changes in the
obligations and goals of institutional technology transfer offices. Various
recommendations exist that could be the basis of regulations, including a
recently published, comprehensive National Academies Report that deserves
careful attention, 0 5 and a recent Consensus Statement by The Hinxton Group
on data and materials sharing in stem cell science. 106 The AAMC and others
have urged the separation of intellectual property structures from integrity-
related ones, in order to safeguard integrity. This is idealistic but imperfect,
for it fails to address the institutional corollary of the innovative virtue of the
new scientist. Moreover, the price in practice is technology transfer run
amok, unless one thinks that the role of the university is to reduce access to
medical care as long as doing so makes money, threaten academic stem cell
researchers who might compete, and deceive donors of tissues and funds as
long as the price is right. 107 Academic management of intellectual property
and its licensing should not be divorced from the obligations of a university
to the public, or of a research hospital to present and future patients. One of
the great challenges of our time is to get this right, training the vine of
idealism on the trellis of reality and practical fact. The issue for the
institution is the issue of the profession spelled large: to reconcile competing
concerns within a coherent framework.
B. Collect Data
An empirical basis for regulation requires data and the systemic competence
to use and revise it. The preceding Section provided a taste of how fine-grained
data collection should be, collecting information about contractual variables from
105 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2010), available at http://www.nap.edulcatalog.php?recordid=
13001.
106 Statement on Policies and Practices Governing Data and Materials Sharing and
Intellectual Property in Stem Cell Science, THE HINXTON GROUP (Feb. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.hinxtongroup.org/ConsensusHG 10_FINAL.pdf.
107 See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla.
2003); Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic
Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3 (2003); Taylor, supra note 25.
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result-dependent compensation structures to noncompetes. My goal in this
Section is to move the discussion forward one more step, both by (1) describing
the parameters of a system that would effectively generate inquiry and employ its
answers and by (2) giving some examples of how data might help guide policy
choices through verifying or falsifying their assumptions or premises. The
following Sections will then (3) suggest interim default rules to use until data
justify better ones and (4) outline steps towards the creation of constructive "how
to" models to replace, at least in part, the retrospective and necessarily arbitrary
structure that is in place now.
Before setting out what may appear as an ambitious agenda, it is useful to
demonstrate that data are readily within reach. As the IOM observed, there are no
data on effective management of COIs.108 As this Article has reiterated, there are
no public data supporting the judgments that COI committees are routinely asked
to make, or analyzing the COI effects or innovation contributions of quite various
collaboration arrangements. But what the government and academic institutions
do have are datasets that, if correlated, could provide important answers to
whether, as in other areas of law, the way incentives, compensation, and other
terms are structured affects whether they reinforce quality standards or undercut
them. What is missing is the effort and infrastructure to correlate these variables.
Academic IRBs have isolated adverse event data from clinical trials, not
presently evaluable against financial interest information. The federal
government has data on research misconduct, arising from the Office of Research
Integrity's oversight of academic proceedings for scientific fraud and plagiarism,
but these data are not publicly cross-linked or searchable for whether financial
interests or financial relationships of various forms are differentially associated
with misconduct. State and federal health departments, hospitals, and health-
product consumers all have access to safety information, though this is also not
cross-linked or searchable against research participation or financial interests.
Yet all of these sources, and others outlined in the recommendations of this
Article, provide a basis for optimism. Problems with financial interests and
relationships could be linked in more interesting ways, if data sets are parsed. If
not all relationships cause problems, but some do, and if only some really
promote innovation, regulations could be promulgated accordingly. The data to
determine this are already partly created. COI management could be reserved for
those that are socially useful and regulations could prohibit those that are not as
socially useful, or at least require institutions to internalize to scientists their
management costs.
1. Creating a Networked System for Collection and Use ofData
Situating COIs in the innovation ecology will require a networked system of
186
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data collection. This data collection should occur longitudinally through time, yet
should be comparable and searchable across cases for correlations among key
variables relating to incentives, behaviors, misconduct, and management. If
decisions are to be made locally, then data must be collected locally, shared,
aggregated, and analyzed nationally. It also must be made available, with analytic
results, both locally and nationally, publicly and academically.
Data must be maintained in a manner that permits new premises and
hypotheses to be tested, trends to be noted, and conclusions to be shared and
examined. Data should encompass and link outcomes such as harms to
participants, misconduct allegations and determinations, protocol deviations,
results that cannot be replicated, and withdrawn publications. Those and other
harms should be assessed for their degree of correlation with key variables, such
as incentives and their structures; industries, since industries seem to vary in their
COI and misconduct susceptibility; and the others used in current population
studies referred to above. Studies that would examine the linkages described
above are currently impossible, not because informatics tools are lacking, but
rather because there is no recorded data. Or if these data exist, they are not linked
or shared. Yet this sort of study, involving other variables, is now very possible
in most other areas of medicine and biotechnology. The informatics tools exist
and are in widespread use.
In collecting data, creating standards, formulating rules, and evaluating
impact, it would be beneficial to examine contract terms in determining whether
an academic-industry relationship is positive or negative and whether its
consequences are probable or improbable. So-called sunshine public databases
that purport to justify an inference of wrongdoing based only on dollar values
should become more sophisticated, rather than more unjust. A $3.00 "payment"
of unregistered securities can be far worse than a $20,000 payment for
consulting. Registries should be improved through additional data fields, so that
the public and regulators alike can distinguish toxic and dangerous relationships
from praiseworthy and innovation-producing ones.
In this regard, relevant and correct data categories must be assessed and
separated from those policy-driving factual categories that are not demonstrably
consequential. Above, for example, I rejected the principle that COIs from
securities are always worse than COIs from cash because contracts and context
make a pivotal difference. Yet that overbroad principle is widespread, and the
NIH's zero-dollar threshold for unregistered securities reflects precisely this.
Presumably it is based on the view that securities can inflate in value (while cash
cannot) and an identifiable cognitive transposition error: since lawyers call
options, warrants, privately held stocks, and publicly traded stocks all
"securities," this term should be defined in precisely the same way in COI policy.
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It is necessary to examine the effect of the network of obligations that
surround a scientist. The current regulations, which do not do this, presume that
the significance and effect of interests can be assessed in isolation. To the
contrary, the network of obligations both shapes the actual impact of agreements
and provides a tool to mitigate their effect. A sponsored research agreement that
prohibits sidebar agreements or requires that consulting revenues be assigned to a
general departmental research fund immediately mitigates or prevents COIs. A
sponsor's per-participant research payments can create a COI if paid to a
principal investigator, but not if pooled with other studies' payments, and
distributions are made, regardless of the incentives, for charitable purposes. NIH,
IOM, and AAMC recommendations miss these important tools.
Continuing our network concept, COI management should be linked to the
network of other existing systems that could support the identification and
management of COIs, to improve participant protection and to correct our current
reliance on self-reporting of adverse events by financially interested researchers-
the very matter criticized in the Gelsinger case, 09 which still, ten years later,
remains uncorrected by mandated system improvements. Legally mandated
systems devoted to patient safety, which can be as fine grained as reporting on
the EKG and C02 levels of a patient every few seconds, should be enlisted to
support the safety of research participants. This would be more beneficial than,
for example, insulating from the clinical team all knowledge of their patient's
participation in a research study that would allow them to distinguish clinical trial
expected side effects from unexpected and troubling morbidities requiring naive
exploration at the expense of patients' time, energy, and suffering.
2. Using These Data
Science and data cannot dictate directly which conflicts of interest to tolerate
and what balance of innovation and bias to tolerate. This involves inescapably
normative decisions that ought to be publicly transparent and publicly influenced.
As Robin Feldman has argued, legal importation of scientific standards, under
the false assumption that data themselves will establish decisional norms,
inevitably oversimplifies complex factual questions and conceals complex
normative ones.o"0 It is as mistaken as using virtue narratives, without empirical
roots, to make COI policy.
109 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
I 10 ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAw 49-78 (2009) (providing examples where
the transfer of scientific results or principles to justify reasoning or create rules misstated the
scientific evidence or founded normative rules on fragile empirical foundations); id. at 200
("[Rielying on science creates the illusion of reasonable resolution [and] masks our failure to
resolve the issues at hand or to take responsibility for the decisions we have made. We gain
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Data can and should be used to confirm or falsify the assumptions used in
policy-making. As examples, I shall start with the easy (and unlikely) outliers. If
every form of consulting arrangement and every Bayh-Dole payment always
produces substantial uncontrollable bias or corruption, Bayh-Dole should be
altered, and consulting, barred. It will have been demonstrated that they
uncontrollably harm research, and it will be equally evident-since development
depends on accurate research results-that biased results do a disservice to
innovation development. In that event, the aims and preconditions for research
integrity and robust innovation would be one and the same, so current conflicting
imperatives would be replaced by a more consistent one: protect the innovation
ecology, research objectivity, and human research participants by eliminating all
forms of compensated academic-industry advising. The link would also be
established by the contrary, equally unlikely finding that no consulting
arrangements or Bayh-Dole licenses harmed research objectivity or participants
and that in all cases, regardless of the nature and scope of services, they
benefitted innovation development.
More realistically, in order to demonstrate how powerful and worthwhile
data collection could be, let us consider the following example in which
hypothetical data concerning the differential positive effects of contractual
noncompetes and unregistered equity might support a currently counterintuitive
policy outcome:
A scientist's area of expertise is in a certain biological factor,
found in human blood, believed to play multiple roles in red
blood cell metabolism. Through continuing NIH-funded
research, he discovers that a particular enzyme enhances the
metabolic effect of the factor and hypothesizes that the enzyme
could be used to alleviate certain anemias. The university files a
method patent claiming use of this enzyme as a therapy for this
purpose and licenses it to a start-up. Consulting by the scientist is
limited to addressing side effects given the factor's other
multiple roles, and, non-exclusively, other enzymes that might
also increase the factor activity. Noncompetes are barred, but
company confidential information will be strictly protected. The
company has no claims to his future inventions, except the
nonexclusive one noted. In this case, his research is intimately
related to the company's application - in fact there is no
possible separation. But his independent academic research goal,
finding other enzymes that enhance this one, is consistent with
both societal therapeutic goals and company goals. The danger
that he will siphon off novel information to the company, which
may suppress competition, is plausible, but given the bar on
noncompetes, and the potential to engage with another company
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around other factors, so is the opposite. He is allowed to hold
unregistered equity in the company, with no further options or
deferred vesting, provided processes can ensure that his novel
information is really nonexclusively provided and is generally
published through the scientific media. So put, with the burden
of doing so on him, he has an incentive to help design and
maintain a sufficiently transparent system. Failing that, his
privilege to hold equity will be revoked. Data show that holding
unregistered equity without further result-dependent options or
vesting is actually harmless, because its ultimate sale will occur
only after a long process of multiple independent valuations of
the technology. Scientists know this and the remoteness and
hypothetical nature of the benefit produce negligible bias
incentives compared to their academic and personal incentives to
do innovative, replicable, sound science.
To Virtue-Prohibitionists, and even to COI-moderates, the example above is
provocative, given their belief that equity is always evil."' This example
challenges a reflex to deny equity and involvement by the scientist in a project
squarely within his academic research, as well as an opposing reflex in industry
to turn him into a jack-of-all-trades scientific salesman with potential investors.
The scientist's role is really quite precise: do your academic work, continue to
publish it nonexclusively, and, if in the development of this there are insights that
would protect patients from side-effects, or boost the therapeutic value, tell the
company. The scientist takes a part, as Bayh-Dole demands, of the value of the
original invention, and remains aligned to see that it works in practice. At the
same time, no commitment is made to this company that it will be the only one,
and if he generates more discoveries, other companies will be interested in
competing for his attentions. He is in a position of having to maintain
confidentiality among companies, something that lawyers have become
accustomed to without difficulty, as have doctors with patients.
For our second example, let us suppose that data show that
institutionally managed service arrangements can effectively mitigate bias
influences that would otherwise arise under certain consulting arrangements:
A scientist, who is an expert in genomic informatics analysis, is
approached by a large company that wants her to adapt her
already powerful analytic software tools to a "new generation"
of DNA sequencers that look beyond single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) and exomes. The key challenge in DNA
190
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sequencing is determining which elements and associations are
meaningful, how meaningful they are, and which are recurring,
but accidental. Hybridizing the company's premier sequencing
capabilities with the next stage in her informatics platform is
exciting to her, and, if it works, worthwhile, given the new
window into understanding genes in operation. The company
wants to engage her exclusively to consult and to own her
output, which would be funded in part by NIH grants already
awarded for the same work. They would offer her $150,000 per
year.
Given what data show and the normative appreciation for the
social importance of the work, the agreement is converted into a
service agreement between the university and the company.
Improvements to the platform that are not unique to the
company's technology will be owned by the university and made
available open source. Unique improvements that co-depend on
company technology and would therefore reveal trade secrets are
co-owned, but the university's uses are limited to internal
research. And the collaboration is mutual, not unilateral, in that
the company agrees to make its advanced sequencing services
available at discount for a well-publicized effort to address
certain pediatric orphan diseases. Publication is joint with
respect to materials that are not trade secrets. She receives
$150,000 per year: half personally as salary support with an
increment, and half, by her choice, paid directly to a research
fund for her at the university. She intends to use these funds in
the event that her NIH funding dries up.
This example is also deliberately provocative. Yet, I submit it is possible that
it may be eminently sensible in promoting industry innovation at the same time it
co-funds NIH-funded scientific advances for the public good that are made
available in an open-source format. Based on a combination of real examples
negotiated by the author, it takes seriously the idea that even where originally
misaligned, company and academic goals can become realigned in a way faithful
to academic values and the purposes of federal funding. This case is better than
the first one, because the company is playing an active reciprocal role. The
scientist's contribution to innovation is real and direct. The company's
contribution to co-funding, with the federal government, improvements to
technology that will become publicly available also is tangible and direct. The
generation of applications for the private sector, sought by Bayh-Dole, is direct.
The benefit to the public from open source improvements is direct. And yet, if
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one had posed the question of whether the doctor can take $150,000 per year
from a company to do consulting work in the area of her funded research, the
conventional COI answer would have been "absolutely not."
C Default Rules
A comprehensive regulatory framework cannot be adopted until more data
collection occurs. In the interim, however, some basic default rules can guide
policy implementation and practice:
1. Prohibit deferred vesting, noncompetes, result-dependent transfers of
unrestricted publicly traded equity, publication restrictions except for trade
secrets, terminations without cause, company sole ownership of academically
overlapping IP, and service definitions not tied to the original innovation or
that aspect of development within contributory expertise.
2. Require collaborative improvement licenses or co-ownership by academic
institutions for internal research, and ensure, at the least, nonexclusive
availability of academic improvements subject to company trade secrets and
distinct company patent rights.
3. Convert direct payments into institutionally managed payments provided that
no institutional COIs are created in the process. This would require taking
action to assure the independence of institutional review processes.
Our default rules should incentivize issuers, interpreters, and subjects of
contractual agreements to act appropriately. Interpreters, for example, might be
incentivized to develop pertinent databases and quality improvement program-
based approaches by inflicting the severer sort of prohibition. In effect, this takes
the AAMC presumption and kicks it up one notch, from the individual to the
organization interpreter, and up two notches in the case of the funder or regulator
as issuer. Harsher rules are likely to incentivize the faculty to participate in such
efforts in data collection to support some other, perhaps local, rule, although,
given what is at stake, the biases inherent in their impulse would also have to be
controlled for. A funder's default rule could be prohibitory, or it could possibly
be disclosure oriented, to require scientists to self-identify to peer reviewers their
form and degree of industry involvement (including purpose, role, and contract
commitments). The goal would be for NIH to develop and fund research
programs and databases devoted to resolving the fundamental issues.
Our default rules should also internalize to researchers and companies the
costs of assessing and managing self-serving and socially ambiguous COIs by
imposing a financial assessment on researchers engaged in such COI-generating
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behaviorally validated function, differentially cost-shifting arrangements that
deviate from a socially ideal mixture of functions that optimize ethical and
efficient development of safe and effective diagnostics while minimizing bias. It
seems unlikely that there is a single point at which all values are maximized,
while biases are minimized. Yet the thought that utility maximization, with or
without de-consequentialist parameters, may be more complex than X, Y, and an
asymptote, or a straight inclined line within a region of zero risk, has not defeated
utilitarianism yet. Indeed, competing functions may disparately weigh many
variables. But whether the justification is as theoretical as internalizing costs, as
pragmatic as disincentivizing COI complexities, or as practical as funding the
management process so it can actually occur, there seems little to be said in favor
of allowing the present COI management system to continue - allowing scientists
to free-ride on other systems to pursue private benefit, if it is socially undesirable
and solely self-serving.
D. Move from Retrospective COI Determinations to "How To " Models
COI management currently involves retrospective, nontransparent
administration under a vague standard. Voluntary compliance is difficult. The
value of data-informed transactional safe harbors, or "here is how to do it right"
models, is obvious. Describing such models means rethinking the boundaries of
researchers' and doctors' professional virtues. This is an exercise long overdue.
Some fear that doing so will require abandoning professional virtue. Let us
address this important concern through an example from health care
professionalism itself.
Fifteen years ago, in the heights of managed care, the great conflict-of-
interest issue was the antagonism perceived between cost containment and a
fiduciary obligation to individual patients to provide optimum care. It was in
such terms that the issue came to the Supreme Court. A patient's appendix
ruptured, due to a belated referral to an in-network provider incentivized by a
physician payment structure in a physician-owned HMO.ll 2 The Court was asked
whether, in the ERISA context in which the case arose, the physician had a
fiduciary duty to the patient. The Supreme Court answered in the negative,
issuing a binary decision in a complex area. This was a pyrrhic victory for
managed care, because it spelled the beginning of a series of legislative reversals
in almost every state around the country that ultimately destroyed managed care.
Drawing the connection between the death of managed care and professional
self-definition, Einer Elhauge predicted that, for care cost to be addressed,
physicians would have to redefine their fiduciary focus from the individual to the
group-an idea that no doubt seemed wholly demonic from the perspective of
112 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
193
59
Taylor: Innovation Incentives or Corrupt Conflicts of Interest? Moving Be
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
physician leaders.113 Yet, I would submit that this is exactly what has occurred,
and in a manner that has enhanced, not undermined, the virtue of the profession.
The route was through the concurrent development of evidence-based
medicine and safety systems, linked with concerns about undertreatment,
overtreatment, and mistreatment. It is only a small step to move from those
concerns to defining overtreatment as treatment with diminishing marginal
benefits and increasing individual patient harms across a population. It is another
small step to create treatment protocols, based on the population, that will typify
proper treatment in similar terms. It is only one more small step to broaden the
concept of marginal benefit and marginal cost to take into account the allocation
and optimal investment, from a care perspective, of limited physician, nursing,
and other professional resources in a context of diminishing benefit. Given that
labor costs drive the bulk of hospital and physician bills, such a concept implies a
virtuous "group" model. The virtue of physicians is no longer measured just by
an intention towards an individual patient. It is measured by the physician's
devotion, judgment, and skill in relationship to a clinical treatment ideal, the
ability to weigh competing concerns, and the ability to make exceptions when
clinically appropriate in relationship to outcomes: in short, the ability to act
justly - to treat like cases as like and different cases differently, where there is a
special justification. Justice and treatment based on knowledge sound like
virtues. Fulfilling Elhauge's prediction did not require abandoning virtue. It
required an interlinked maturation of how the profession conceived itself and the
systems that would allow it to act consistently with that definition. With that
maturation it became possible to design incentives and care structures that
promoted appropriate utilization as an aspect of patient care.
Here, data are needed to establish when collaborations are useful, and what
collaboration structures should be avoided or followed. There are plausible
candidates already. Institutional collection, pooling, and redistribution of
consulting revenue in connection with technical advisory services, all mediate
incentives and focus contributions. The default rules, if vindicated empirically,
suggest others.
V. CONCLUSION
Industry and academic biomedical research draw continuously closer, as
inevitable partners in creating the practical fruits of scientific discovery. If
industry relies on academia for new insights, academia relies on industry to
113 See Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 365, 387 (2006). Professor Elhauge's prediction was made in the context of two
important observations: that the law supports systems of payment and care that not only compete
but mutually detract; and that professional and public morality have had an extraordinary influence
on the chosen paradigms. Id. at 379-84. His views on the causes of mutual incoherence, as well as
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demonstrate the practical value of basic science to a public that requires more
than knowledge for knowledge's sake. Fear of research bias, or its appearance
from industry contact, has been a preoccupation of academic medicine, its
funding agencies, and its political arms. Reputable journals decry highly paid
relationships with industry as "typical," implying that all public advice and
academic research have become untrustworthy."l 4 Yet such conflict has been
addressed without collecting data as to whether, how, and when it occurs or
assessing the actual benefit of different forms of industry collaboration, or
offering precise guidance reflecting those facts.
The regulatory structures created in consequence are loose and weak.
Agencies are divided among several government entities and hundreds of
research universities and research hospitals-all operating under unarticulated or
inconsistent standards, created with limited or no data concerning their necessity
or effect, and many without processes to control the institutional conflicts of
interests that could demonstrably affect their reliability and bias. So piecemeal
and inconsistent is the legal structure, so diversely rationalized, and so premature
compared to datasets, that a student of law might well ask whether the structure
is law and what makes it so. It is law in only the barest of senses. There is a basic
mandate to do X. And if X is not done, the issuer will do something predictably
bad. Except that not even that has happened; the NIH did not enforce these
regulations, even when the system repeatedly failed over the course of many
years.
This aerial sense of law rightly has been replaced by a more sophisticated
114 See, e.g., Charles Seife, How Drug Company Money is Undermining Science, Sci. AM.
(Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://www.scientificamerican.conarticle.cfm?id=how-drug-
company-money-undermining-science. Although he observed that "such relationships are not all
bad," Seife does not identify or establish that any are actually beneficial. Instead he describes as
"typical" (1) known cases in which senior government advisors on drug or device approval have
simultaneously maintained highly compensated advisory relationships with industry; (2) extreme
practices, such as companies "ghost writing" publications describing research results that are
signed by academic researchers who had little involvement, but accepted both fees and attribution;
and (3) critics' claims that the NIH is doing little to police such situations. Seife asserts that only a
change in research culture can restore trustworthiness to science. This Article, however, disputes
the assertion that such arrangements are typical of all scientists and collaboration arrangements, and
the conclusion that cultural segregation is the only (or even a complete) solution. As I have shown,
collaboration arrangements are far more varied, and the arrangements to which Seife refers are
neither representative nor ubiquitous. The small number of senior advisers to both pharma and
government, who have met the substantive and political selection criteria each imposes, are hardly
representative of the thousands of relatively unknown academic scientists whose primary work is in
laboratories in research universities. The disgraceful practice of ghost writing is limited to some
companies and faculty. Institutional and professional culture are important, but Seife fails to
mention the ways in which they have been fostered by the NIH and the HHS Office of Research
Integrity (ORI), nor does he reconcile it with our innovative ecology. See, e.g., Brian C. Martinson
et al., Scientists behaving badly, 435 NATURE 737 (2005); Brian C. Martinson et al., Scientists'
Perceptions of Organizational Justice and Self-Reported Misbehaviors, I J. EMPIR. RES. ON HUM.
REs. ETHICS 51 (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 93.300(c); and 45 C.F.R. §§ 689.1-.10 (2002).
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one that seeks (1) an interplay of law and facts - a connection between the
issuer's objectives and the interpreter's methods based on facts reasonably
known to be material, both to predictable resolution of foreseen problems and to
wise resolution of unforeseen ones; and (2) an assessment of the rationality
against multiple perspectives, including the perspectives not just of issuer and
interpreter, but those subject to regulation, and those observing, and sees how a
law is understood and thus made real, not once, but over time, again and again
and again, as it travels through society. The COI problem therefore teaches a
general lesson about the dangers in the law-making domain of even the highest
virtue when it is separated from the interrelationship of law and fact. Those who
ride under the banners of virtue and public trust and seek to make law their
mount must bend to the demands that lawmaking places on all of us, including
the truthfulness of their empirical premises, the rationality and empirical
testability of their solutions, the values that law translates into paradigm and
practice, and the transparency and acceptability-and therefore authority-of a
proposed resolution.
The solution proposed by this Article is simple yet radical: to recognize our
mistake and to correct it with an epistemically competent system operating from
ascertained and pertinent facts. This will require critical novel features: a set of
common and clear norms rationally derived from data and evidence,
representative of both innovation and research integrity; competent and qualified
agencies that will consistently teach and enforce them; and mechanisms for
sharing and aggregating information, self-assessment, accountability, and
evolution.
The point is not that morals should be abandoned. Rather, it is that the
temptations of a facile hypocrisy incentivizing collaboration with one hand,
while punishing with another, should be relinquished. What is at stake is more
than whether researchers are forced into the discomforts of eternal cognitive
dissonance. It is whether the social compact that underlies the sanctioned pursuit
of knowledge will hold. The Virtue-Prohibitionists have this right: to the extent
that scientists are perceived as trading integrity for personal wealth, the lay
society will respond accordingly. Our current scheme for biomedical research is a
powerful recipe for destroying public trust, since internal conflicts make failure
inevitable. Neither knowledge nor democratic influence over scientific direction
will benefit from one-sided, incomplete renditions of COIs in the innovation
ecology.
A fuller discussion of the variety of collaboration arrangements-both the net
of contracting parties in a research-related relationship and the diversity of
contractual terms-is beyond the scope of this article. But such detail is not
necessary to understand the basic frame of the argument or recommendations.
Resolving these tensions ethically, practically, and effectively is one of the major
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principled, approach. This will not arise through disintegrated policy that
dispenses with precision about the drivers and checks on human fallibility, and
the true contributions of academic knowledge.
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